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PREFACE
The Czech Presidency of the European Union (EU) in the first half of
2009 coincided with a number of events that posed great challenges to
Czech leadership abilities. Being the second country to hold the presidency
out of the three that make up the Trio, the Czech Republic had a hard act
to follow after the decisively active French Presidency dominated by its
determined President, Nicholas Sarkozy. If such were the concerns of the
Czech Presidency when it took over at the helm of the EU in January
2009, it would soon become clear that the prevailing tension in the domestic
political context in the Czech Republic would pose an even larger chal-
lenge to the presidency and eventually bring the sitting government to fall
mid-way through the six month period.
As in previous presidencies, the Czech government had to face a number
of external challenges. In January, the in-coming presidency had to deal
with three hot dossiers: the gas crisis sparked off by a dispute between
Ukraine and Russia; the flaring up of hostilities in the Gaza Strip; and the
handling of the worst economic and financial crisis since the Great
Depression in the 1930s. As concerns the domestic dimension of Czech
EU policy, the fate of the hotly contested Lisbon Treaty and the govern-
ment’s inability to secure its ratification in parliament dominated the political
scene and clearly weakened the Topolanek leadership. Despite the internal
political difficulties, the Czech presidency still managed to push a number
of policy dossiers forward, mainly in the economic domain, which speaks
to the resilience of the EU political and administrative system. The Czech
Presidency of the EU, however, reminds us that domestic politics are part
and parcel of the EU, and create for good or bad, a direct link between
policy-making on the national and European levels.
The Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies publishes twice a year a
report on the incumbent national presidency of the EU focusing on the
presidencis priorities and ongoing European agenda on the one hand, and
on the influence of domestic politics and external event on the other.
Anna Stellinger
Director, SIEPS
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The Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, SIEPS, conducts and
promotes research and analysis of European policy issues. The results
are presented in reports and at seminars. SIEPS strives to act as a
link between the academic world and policy-makers at various levels.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Czech Presidency of the EU came at an incredibly difficult time for
both the EU and the Czech Republic. It started with extremely low expec-
tations and many doubts as to whether the Czechs would be able to run
the EU. The Czech Republic had to cope with the legacy of a strong and
determined French Presidency that also had to tackle unexpected crises,
such as the economic crisis and the Russia-Georgia conflict of 2008. The
French leadership, marked by the highly determined personal involvement
of President Sarkozy, was thus taken by many as a benchmark, despite the
fact that this style of Presidency was an exception rather than the rule. The
internal political situation in the Czech Republic, with a government
unsure of its parliamentary support and a president considered by many
European leaders as a hardcore Eurosceptic, reinforced this scepticism
about the Czech leadership capacity. Another big issue that focused atten-
tion on the Czech Presidency was the fact that the Government was unable
to achieve the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in the Czech parliament,
despite the Constitutional Court’s positive assessment of its compatibility
with the Czech constitution. 
The Presidency’s term coincided with the escalation of the economic crisis,
which had started under previous presidencies. The facts that the Czech
Republic is not a major EU economy, is not in the Eurozone and was
holding the Presidency for the first time raised some doubts as to whether
it would be able to mediate an efficient response to the crisis among the
EU-27, and among the other major world economies represented in the
G20 group. Despite this, the Czech Prime Minister managed to bring the
European heads of government to agreement on the mandate for the G20
negotiations in London in April 2009 and to endorse clearly that the cur-
rent economic crisis could not serve as a pretext for introducing national
protectionist measures that would undermine the European internal market.
Similarly, the Presidency was instrumental in striking a deal on an addi-
tional package for the European economy amounting to EUR 130 billion
and simultaneously ruling out a specific rescue package for Central and
Eastern Europe, leading to both the Prime Minister Topolánek and Com-
mission President Barroso calling the spring European Council meeting a
‘summit of results’. Still, the economic crisis has substantially shifted the
focus of the Presidency in the economic domain. While the Czechs were
originally determined to push for more liberalisation in the internal market
and decreasing the regulatory burden, in the end they found themselves
having to protect the fundamentals of the EU internal market.  
Furthermore, right from the start, the Presidency was faced with two addi-
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7tional challenges, referred to by Prime Minister Topolánek as the ‘2 Gs’,
i.e. Gaza and gas. In the case of Gaza, the Presidency did not score too
well and its activity did not lead to any particular solution, apart from
opening humanitarian corridors in the Gaza Strip, but it remains an open
question whether the EU had necessary leverage, particularly over Israel,
and whether a quick ceasefire could realistically have been negotiated with
EU mediation. The Presidency fared much better in the case of the gas dis-
pute between Russia and Ukraine, and the personal involvement of key
Czech politicians, including the Prime Minister, with the strong backing of
the European Commission resulted in gradual resolution of the crisis,
despite the previous scepticism. 
The gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine also helped the Czech Presi-
dency push for another of its main objectives: forging a more comprehen-
sive external energy security policy and accepting commitments to further
action in that regard, which were integral to the European Council conclu-
sions in March. The Presidency won reiterated European Commission sup-
port for the Nabucco project, which many in the EU had already considered
dead, including financial pledges amounting to EUR 200 million, and funds
for improving interconnectivity among the Member States’ energy systems. 
Despite the approaching end of term of the European Parliament, the
Presidency has also promoted several legislative deals on behalf of the
Council, mainly in the economic domain, for example, on road and air
transport, energy liberalisation, solvency and roaming. 
The political situation in the Czech Republic differed greatly from the strong
backing President Sarkozy was enjoying in France, in terms of both political
representation and media coverage, and this turned out to be detrimental to
the Presidency’s performance. Internal squabbling among the various parlia-
mentary factions of the coalition parties and ongoing pressure from the
opposition, which did not like to see the Government winning political
points due to rather positive perceptions of the EU Presidency on the part
of Czech media and citizens, resulted in the Government losing a vote of
confidence in the lower chamber on 24 March 2009, throwing the Presiden-
cy into political disarray. It remains to be seen how the rest of the Czech
term will be handled, but there are widespread fears in Europe regarding
the political leadership vacuum, the greater role of President Klaus and
complications accompanying the Lisbon Treaty ratification. The risk is that
the hard-won successes of the Presidency, achieved in the face of initial
scepticism, will soon be forgotten and that it will be a ‘lame duck’ Presidency
for the rest of its term, with ambitious projects such as the Eastern Partner-
ship or Southern Corridor summits turning into second-class meetings. 
1 INTRODUCTION: CZECH EURO-ATLANTIC
CONSENSUS OF THE PRE-ACCESSION ERA 
Since the fall of communism and the centrally planned economy in autumn
1989, Euro-Atlantic integration has been the top priority of each succes-
sive Czech Government. ‘Back to Europe’ was one slogan of the
Czechoslovak Velvet Revolution, and it was supposed to be fulfilled by
securing fully-fledged membership in the European Union (EU) and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Even the first government that
emerged from Czechoslovakia’s first democratic elections undertook
crucial steps towards future integration into the EU. Czechoslovakia joined
the Phare programme1 and started negotiations on the Association Treaty
with the EU in 1990. The Czechoslovak Government succeeded the next
year in concluding negotiations and in signing the Association Treaty with
the European Community. This step, together with the dissolution of the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECOM) and the Warsaw
Pact2 in 1991, enabled Czechoslovakia to move towards integration into the
EU and NATO. 
The division of Czechoslovakia and creation of the independent Czech
Republic in January 1993 slowed down the EU association process, as the
Association Treaty with Czechoslovakia did not enter into force and the
EU required its renegotiation with both successor states. The newly negoti-
ated treaties with both countries entered into force in 1995, but the paths
of both countries into the EU were already very different3. In the Czech
Republic, there had been broad consensus among almost all major political
actors as to the inevitability (and desirability) of EU and NATO member-
ship. It was generally perceived that only membership in these two interna-
tional organisations could bring security and prosperity to the Czech
Republic. Of all the Czech Republic’s major political parties, only the
Communists (KSCˇM)4 and Republicans (SPR–RSC)5 opposed membership
in both organisations.
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1 Poland and Hungary: Action for the Restructuring of the Economy was a programme
launched by the European Commission in 1989 to assist the socio–economic transition of
these two countries. In following years, other countries from Central and Eastern Europe
joined the programme.
2 COMECOM was an economic organisation created by socialist countries in 1949 in
response to the Marshall Plan. The Warsaw Pact was a military organisation of socialist
states created in 1955 in direct response to West Germany’s accession to NATO.
3 Slovakia was ruled by the autocratic government led by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar in
the 1994–1998 period. After several warnings criticising the country’s lack of democracy,
Slovakia was practically excluded from the process of integration into the EU and NATO.
4 The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia – direct successor of the Communist Party
of Czechoslovakia. 
5 Extremist right-wing party, represented in the Czech Parliament until 1998.
Between 1992 and 1997, the Czech Republic was led by Prime Minister
Václav Klaus, who believed that the country was more advanced than the
other countries of the region and should be the first to enter the EU (see
below). This conviction was strengthened by quite stable economic growth,
the very good starting position of the Czech economy and by the fact that
the Czech Republic was the first former-communist country from the
region to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) in 1995. However, too little was done during this period to
prepare for EU accession. Moreover, regional cooperation in the frame-
work of the Visegrad Group6 was almost boycotted by Czech leadership,
which did not want to ‘wait’ for the other countries in the integration
process. Ironically, the Czech Government was one of the last to submit
the official application for EU membership in January 1996 (followed only
by Slovenia). 
The process of integration into NATO took its own pace. The country
quickly joined the Partnership for Peace programme and did its best to be
invited to join the alliance. This happened at the Madrid NATO summit in
1997 and the country joined two years later in 1999. There was a broad
consensus among the Czech political parties (except for the Communists
and Republicans) on NATO membership, and the main question discussed
in those days was whether to seek endorsement of membership in a refer-
endum. The Social Democrats particularly advocated this option at the
beginning of the process of ratifying the NATO accession treaty, but at a
later stage they came to support ratification without referendum. Over
the following ten years, the NATO membership consensus among Czech
political leadership was never questioned. Nevertheless, there was some
disagreement regarding involvement in NATO activities. For example, soon
after joining NATO, Václav Klaus (then Speaker of the Chamber of
Deputies) strongly disagreed with NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia. A
similar attitude was articulated by Foreign Minister Jan Kavan (Social
Democratic member), who developed the Czech–Greek initiative intended
to avert military intervention. Similarly, in early 2009 there was quite heated
debate in Parliament on the level of deployment of Czech soldiers in
various missions abroad, most of them under NATO command, with the
Social Democrats advocating reduction of the levels of deployment
proposed by the governing coalition. 
9
6 Regional cooperation format, created in February 1991, to coordinate the EU and NATO
accession processes among Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary in the Hungarian castle of
Visegrad.
The resignation of Václav Klaus from the position of Czech Prime
Minister in 1997 was an important milestone in the Czech Republic’s
European policy7. His resignation was followed by the split of his Civic
Democratic Party (ODS). Former ODS members created a new party,
Union of Freedom, which defined itself as liberal and strongly pro-Euro-
pean, while Klaus’s ODS gradually positioned itself as a conservative
‘Euro-realistic’ party,8 though still supporting the Czech Republic’s acces-
sion to the EU.
The real effort to join the EU started only with the opening of the acces-
sion negotiations in 1998 and was strengthened with the 1999 adoption of
the regatta principle in accession negotiations in 19999. Successive govern-
ments (1998–2002, 2002–2006) led by the Social Democrats (CˇSSD) guided
the Czech Republic through the accession process and the referendum on
EU membership in 2003. All major political forces, except the Commu-
nists (KSCˇM), promoted the ‘yes’ vote for the EU. The accession of the
Czech Republic to the EU was approved by 77 per cent of those who voted
(the turnout was 55 per cent) and the country joined the EU on 1 May
2004. This date can also be considered as marking the end of strong con-
sensus among Czech political leaders on European issues. The necessity of
pulling in one direction has since disappeared and individual political
actors have started to promote their own opinions on the character of
European integration.
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7 Václav Klaus will be treated in greater detail later in this report.
8 In April 2001, the party introduced the so-called Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism, which
strongly advocated the intergovernmental principle in the EU.
9 This principle was introduced at the Helsinki Summit in 1999, to enable the countries that
started the accession negotiations later to catch up with the first group (i.e. Czech Republic,
Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus).
2 THE CZECH EUROPEAN POLICY
2.1 Political parties’ attitudes vis-à-vis the European
Union and public opinion 
The political party system of the Czech Republic, unlike that of most other
countries in the Central–East European region, is relatively stable, resem-
bling party systems elsewhere in Western Europe in terms of the cleavages
separating political parties. The Czech political scene evolved over the
1990s into a system of two dominant parties, the Civic Democratic Party
(ODS) being the major force on the right and the Czech Social Democratic
Party (CˇSSD) being the leader of the left. Thus the main cleavage typical
of Western European parties, the socio–economic cleavage, has become the
main determinant of the Czech political scene as well.10
Apart from the two main parties, two smaller parties have traditionally
made their way into Parliament. One of them is the Communist Party of
Bohemia and Moravia (KSCˇM) and the other the Christian Democratic
Union–Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU–CSL). The former is a hardcore
Communist party, claiming the legacy of the former Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia and refusing to renounce the Communist era. The latter is
a centrist party with huge coalition potential (it has formed coalitions with
both ODS and CˇSSD), basing its programme mainly on the legacy of the
Christian-Democratic movement, i.e. a mixture of economic liberalism and
internal political solidarity, while socially being rather conservative. Other
parties have usually entered Parliament in the past – the Civic Democratic
Alliance (ODA), Freedom Union (US), and more recently the Green Party
(SZ) – but none has asserted itself as a stable force on the Czech political
scene. This indicates that there is still scope for a liberal party in the centre
of the political scene, though liberalism as a political concept does not
seem to appeal strongly to Czech voters. On the other hand, the emergence
of the Green Party with its emphasis on post-material values clearly indi-
cates that Czech society is moving from a transformation to a post-modern
phase, in which voters are starting to acknowledge the importance of other
issues than those represented in the traditional right–left cleavage.
Another noteworthy feature is the absence of extremist parties (at least at
the parliamentary level), although many political analysts consider the
Communist party to be radically left wing. This observation applies mainly
to right-wing parties, which in Western Europe are traditionally nationalist,
xenophobic and – importantly for this study – anti-European or at least
11
10 Hlousek, V. and Kopecek, L., Cleavages in Contemporary Czech and Slovak Politics:
Between Persistence and Change, Working paper (IIPS, Brno, 2005).
Eurosceptical. As they are not even present, ODS has picked up something
of their rhetoric, as we will explain later. 
In the following section, we will outline the Czech political parties
currently represented in the Chamber of Deputies (the lower chamber of
the Czech Parliament) and their attitudes towards the EU.
Civic Democratic Party (ODS)
The Civic Democratic Party led the governing coalition until the no-confi-
dence vote on the outgoing government on 24 March, enjoying the strong-
est representation in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Its atti-
tude towards the EU is arguably the most difficult to describe of those of all
Czech parliamentary parties. Two things are noteworthy in this respect. One
is the internal cleavage inside the party vis-à-vis Europe, evident especially
after the party assumed power in 2006 after almost ten years in opposition.
The other is the discrepancy between the attitudes towards the EU of the
party leadership and those of its voters. This discrepancy, however, applies
to the same degree to the other major party, the Social Democrats, and will
be elaborated on in the section dealing with public opinion11.
ODS has never disputed the need of the Czech Republic to be part of the
EU. It was in 1996 under the premiership of Václav Klaus that the country
applied for EU membership, and in 2003, ODS was the first party to start
the accession referendum campaign, with its slogan ‘If Europe, then with
ODS’. However, the party’s attitude towards the EU has always been
cautious, to say the least, with Václav Klaus referring to Czech member-
ship in the EU as merely a ‘marriage of convenience’. Since 1997, the
party, probably due to being in opposition and thus practically excluded
from any stake in the accession negotiations, adopted an increasingly
Eurosceptic (or Eurorealist) discourse. Such discourse is based on the
following main premises: 
• European integration should remain merely an economic project and
no further moves towards forming a political Europe are desirable; 
• no more competences should be transferred to Brussels, unless abso-
lutely necessary;
• there is an absolute need to keep the national veto in taxation, social
policy and foreign policy;
• smaller Member States must be defended against what is perceived as
an emerging ‘directoire’ of the big Member States;
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11 See, for example, Drulak, P., The Czech EU Presidency: Background and Priorities
(Notre Europe, Paris, 2008).
• linked to this, a desire to preserve the status quo in terms of Czech
decision-making power, particularly in the Council;
• opposition to European emancipation in the defence field, strong
belief in the relevance of NATO and in the necessity of the United
States being involved in European security;
• a generally stronger inclination towards intergovernmental rather than
community method, and suspicion regarding any stronger role for the
European Commission and European Parliament.
Articulation of most of these points was particularly evident during the
Constitutional Treaty negotiations, when ODS was represented by Jan
Zahradil (representing the Chamber of Deputies). After Václav Klaus left
the party ahead of his election as the country’s president in 2003, it was
Zahradil who became the main ODS spokesperson on European issues. In
addition, Zahradil, was one of the few members of the Convention, who
refused to approve the final draft produced by Convention. 
Although ODS is a member of the EPP–ED Group in the European Parlia-
ment, like the British Conservatives, it has failed to align itself with the
other parties in the group on many issues, the Constitutional Treaty being
one such issue all its deputies voted against. The British Conservatives
(Tories) are often referred to by ODS leaders as their closest allies in the
EU. As early as 2007, British Conservative leader David Cameron and
incumbent ODS leader and Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek presented the
idea of creating a new group in the European Parliament after the 2009
elections, indicating their intention to leave the EPP–ED group.
However, when the party assumed power after the 2006 parliamentary
elections, the discourse started to change and the internal divisions, latently
present even before, became more obvious. Particularly striking is the
difference between the attitudes of party members holding executive posts
and of ODS parliamentarians, especially those in the Senate. The assump-
tion of the Government, however, is only one explanation for the shifting
attitude of ODS, the other being the upcoming Czech Presidency. Both
factors were gradually leading to the ‘Europeanisation’ of ODS leadership,
realising that the party has to play a constructive role if the Czech
Republic is not to be marginalised in the EU. This also explains why the
Czech Republic was not the main trouble-maker in negotiating the Lisbon
Treaty. However, there is still a substantial number of party members whose
attitudes can be described as hardcore Eurosceptic, making them ‘Euro
hawks’. The spiritual leader of this group is President Václav Klaus, who
has opposed both the Constitutional and Lisbon treaties, denied that global
climate change is caused by human activity, and argued that the EU should
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embrace countries such as Kazakhstan and Morocco. The other stream in
the party, which we refer to as ‘Euro doves’, is represented by the current
Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek and Deputy Prime Minister for EU
Affairs Alexandr Vondra. Despite their strong and enduring suspicions
regarding the general direction in which the EU is moving, their approach
is much more pragmatic, acknowledging the need for engagement and
constructive dialogue inside the EU, including with countries that might
have different fundamental outlooks.
The clash between the ‘Euro hawks’ and ‘Euro doves’ escalated before and
during the ODS Party congress in December 2008, which was to determine
ODS European policy in the near future. The resounding victory of
Topolánek indicated that the ODS was most likely leaving behind Klaus’s
Eurosceptic discourse, represented by Topolánek’s opponent for ODS
leadership, Pavel Bem (Lord Mayor of Prague). Subsequently, some ODS
members decided to form a new party, the Party of Free Citizens, backed
by Klaus. However, one might argue that the fight is not yet over, and that
the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty will remain the main litmus test of
where ODS currently stands on European issues.
Czech Social Democratic Party (CˇSSD)
The Social Democrats were the party that led the Czech Republic through
the accession negotiations with the EU. Their tenure of office in this critical
period is perceived by the party as one of its major achievements while in
power, contributing to its already strongly pro-European inclination. 
Generally speaking, CˇSSD is in many ways the antipole of ODS as far as
European policies are concerned. While ODS opposes the further political
integration of Europe, CˇSSD is strongly in favour. While ODS is sceptical
about the quick adoption of the Euro, CˇSSD supports it vigorously. CˇSSD
generally does not have a problem with the European Commission and
European Parliament playing stronger roles, prefers Community to inter-
governmental methods, is not a priori opposed to giving more competences
to Brussels, even in areas such as justice, home affairs and social policy,
and supports robust European foreign policy and defence. The diverging
views of the two main political parties explain why Czech European policy
is so strongly polarised. This polarisation is quite exceptional in the context
of Central and Eastern Europe, as in the other countries we instead see a
strong consensus on the necessity ‘of staying within the mainstream’,
European issues generally not being subject to heated domestic debate
(with the exception of Poland’s Law and Justice and Slovakia’s KDH
parties). 
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On the other hand, this polarisation does not mean that CˇSSD and ODS do
not agree on anything in the European agenda. We can identify several
points of convergence between the two main Czech parties:
• both CˇSSD and ODS claim the necessity of preserving the safeguards
of smaller Member States vis-à-vis the big ones;
• both parties want to have a fully representative Commission (i.e. one
national representative per Member State);
• both parties acknowledge the need to revise the European budget,
making it better fit the challenges of the twenty-first century, spend-
ing more money on items such as research and development;
• both parties agree on the need to slim down the CAP and redirect the
payments to other areas;
• both parties also stress the need for unanimity in taxation matters;
• both parties support further enlargement of the EU, including Turkey. 
Although there are considerable differences between the two parties, one
must be careful not to exaggerate them. After the 2006 shift in power,
there has been surprisingly more continuity on European issues than one
would have expected. This is explicable, first, by the ‘Europeanisation’ of
the parties once they assume governmental responsibility and, second, by
the moderating effect of coalition partners, as Czech governments are
usually coalitions due to the country’s proportional representation system.
The third reason is that European issues are used more often in rhetoric
than in real policy as opposition tools for criticising the Government; in
reality, there are more important domestic issues that divide ODS from
CˇSSD, such as taxes, education, health care or pensions. 
Christian Democrats (KDU–CSL)
The Christian Democrats support European integration, and in that sense
represent the mainstream attitudes of other parties in the EPP–ED faction
on the Czech scene. It often finds itself balancing its larger coalition part-
ners, whether ODS or CˇSSD. The party is more supportive of the EU than
is ODS, though it is less enthusiastic about political integration than
CˇSSD. In its foreign policy, the party supports strong European foreign
policy, unlike ODS but is more Atlanticist than CˇSSD is, meaning that it
attaches strong importance to relations with the United States and NATO.
The one significant point of divergence from the other two major parties
concerns EU enlargement. Although the Christian Democrats support
further EU expansion as such, they are more sceptical regarding Turkey
and would prefer that it be granted privileged partnership rather than fully-
fledged membership in the EU. In fact, they were the only party advocat-
ing that the accession negotiations be open ended in nature. 
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The Green Party (SZ) 
The Green Party is a relative newcomer to the Czech Parliament. Its first
six deputies were elected to the lower chamber only in the 2006 elections
and it still has no representative in the Senate, though it became part of the
ruling coalition after the last elections. Its influence over the European
policies of the currently outgoing government is relatively strong, as the
Greens held the Foreign Ministry (through Karel Schwarzenberg, who is
not a party member but was nominated by the party), Ministry of Educa-
tion (Ondrej Liska used to work for Daniel Cohn-Bendit in the European
Parliament) and Ministry of Environment (Martin Bursik is the main party
spokesperson on European issues). The Green Party is generally pro-
European, although its more comprehensive visions of the future of the EU
are not yet well articulated. It has pressed most strongly for European
action in the areas of environment, energy, and development and humanita-
rian policy. 
The Communist Party (KSCˇM)
The Communists are the only Czech political party that opposes Czech
Republic membership in the EU. In this sense, it diverges from the pre-
accession consensus of the other political actors. The party called on its
supporters to vote against membership in the EU accession referendum in
June 2003. It also opposed both the Constitutional and Lisbon treaties. Its
policies are generally based on the negation of post-1989 developments, so
its opposition to the EU must be perceived in this context. The party is
rather isolated and, despite the fact that it is in the long run the third
strongest party on the Czech political scene, it has never been part of any
government since 1990. 
Public opinion
Despite the fact that the Czech Republic is often depicted, especially in the
Western European press, as a rather Eurosceptic country, this does not
seem to be supported by public opinion polls. It is true that, according to
the Eurobarometer 68 opinion poll,12 only 45% of Czech respondents think
that Czech membership in the EU is a good thing, which puts the Czechs
below the EU average of 58%. However, up to 61% of respondents13 in the
same poll believe the Czech Republic has benefited from EU membership,
which puts it slightly above the EU average of 58%. Moreover, 58% of
16
12 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb68_cz_nat.pdf.
13 All the numerical data referred to in this section come from Eurobarometer Survey No 68
(European Commission, 2007).
Czechs are happy with how democracy works in the EU, again a higher
number than the EU average (52%). This represents a higher level of trust
than the Czechs have in democracy in their own country (51% in the same
poll). In all, 58% of Czechs trust the EU as an entity, considerably more
than the EU average of 48%. 
In terms of particular EU policies, the degree of support or enthusiasm
among Czechs differs from one policy area to another, though there is
generally strong support for all the policies included in the Eurobarometer
surveys. There is an astonishingly high degree of support for European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which reaches 85% and is one of the
highest levels in the EU. The support for Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) is also relatively high, around the EU average of 68%. This
is noteworthy, as this high degree of public support does not seem to
reflect the polarising debates or even outright refusal of stronger ESDP/
CFSP by ODS. Another policy that enjoys very strong public support is
EU enlargement. The Czech Republic, with its 62% of support of further
EU expansion, is among the top supporters, the figure being far above the
EU average of 46%. Likewise, Czechs are among the top supporters of the
common immigration policy with 80% support. On the other hand, support
for the single currency is not that high, only 53% of supporters compared
with the EU average of 61%. This figure is still higher than in eight other
countries, though only two of these countries (Cyprus and Greece) are in
the Eurozone. The lukewarm attitude of the Czechs is probably because the
Czech Republic is not in the Eurozone and because there has been neither
wide debate nor an awareness-raising campaign on the costs and benefits
of adopting the single currency. 
One factor that has to be acknowledged and is quite striking on the Czech
political scene is the strange discrepancy between the electoral preferences
of voters and the European policies of the parties for which they vote. As
was explained, ODS is very cautious about the EU, yet its supporters
strongly support further European integration. On the other hand, CˇSSD,
which is enthusiastically pro-European, has much more Eurosceptic sup-
porters. The likeliest explanation for this phenomenon is that the European
agenda is not the most important factor on which the voters base their
electoral choices: they care more about domestic political issues, so do-
mestic programmes largely determine how they vote. It seems that ODS is
starting to understand this discrepancy; indeed, the internal frictions in
ODS during the December 2008 party congress were a clear sign of that. 
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2.2 The Phenomenon of Václav Klaus
As already mentioned, the Czech Republic is sometimes considered to be a
Eurosceptic Member State. This perception might, inter alia, also be
explained by the rather vocal opinions of current Czech President Václav
Klaus, who has presented his critical remarks on European integration and
other issues (notably arguing that climate change is a myth) in both domestic
and international fora. Klaus’s attitude towards the EU was formed in the
1990s and developed into a confirmed position in the second half of the
decade.14 Since this time, he has primarily spoken out against the high le-
vel of political integration and the limits to national sovereignty brought
about by the EU. His stance largely determined the EU policy of the senior
government party ODS before and right after the victory in the 2006
general elections. With the approaching EU Presidency and the ‘socialisa-
tion through Europe’ of the ODS ruling elites, the European policy of the
party shifted towards a realistic pro-EU discourse. This shift is often
viewed as one reason for the divorce of the President (and, until the
December 2008 ODS Congress, the Honorary Chairman of the party) from
the party he founded and whose chairman, Mirek Topolánek, managed his
re-election for his second and final term in office in February 2008.    
The debate on the Lisbon Treaty (and earlier on the Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe) gave him an opportunity to express his strongest
criticism of the EU. Unlike during the campaign before the EU accession
referendum in 2003, when he was hesitant to make a clear personal state-
ment15, in the case of the Lisbon Treaty (and the Constitutional Treaty), he
18
14 As Czech PM, Václav Klaus signed the Association Agreement (1993) as well as the
country’s application to the EU (1996). He perceived as marginal issues both the Associa-
tion Agreement (compared to the transformation efforts) and signing the EU application,
which he viewed pragmatically and first and foremost through the lens of the economic
benefits of integration. After the political developments in the country in 1996–1997 (the
‘Sarajevo coup’ against him when he was abroad, orchestrated by some ODS members due
to a lack of transparency in party financing) and the ODS transition to opposition in 1998,
the issue of EU accession talks became a matter of political dispute with the then senior
government party, CˇSSD. ODS also experienced a discourse shift from (neo)liberalism
towards conservatism, slightly coloured by nationalism. In this period, Václav Klaus’s views
on European integration were supported by a group of young ODS politicians who got
promoted to the senior party posts thanks to the ‘Sarajevo coup’ (e.g. Ivan Langer and Jan
Zahradil). Together with philosopher Miloslav Bednar, Jan Zahradil, Petr Plecity and Petr
Adrian, they wrote the Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism, which served as the background
paper for the ODS policy conferences of April 2001 and for the party’s position on the EU;
see (in Czech) http://www.ods.cz/docs/dokumenty/zahradil-manifest.pdf.  
15 Unlike some ODS members (e.g. Ivan Langer and Martin Rˇíman), Václav Klaus did not
oppose EU accession but declined to endorse the ‘yes’ campaign. According to some,
he did not vote ‘yes’ in the accession referendum; ‘Four Years of the Non-partisan President
Klaus’, Hospodarske noviny, 28 February 2006.
openly opposed the document and its ratification. He defended his stance
in a number of interviews, essays and articles and as a party to the case
before the Czech Constitutional Court, which reviewed the Lisbon Treaty
for compliance with the Czech Constitution on the initiative of several
ODS senators in late 2008. He also supported and promoted the translation
into Czech of works by famous West European Eurosceptics and openly
supported Declan Ganley, the leader of the ‘no’ campaign opposing the
Lisbon Treaty in Ireland, using an official state visit to Ireland (November
2008) for this purpose. 
His main theses on European integration, EU development and the Lisbon
Treaty can be summarised as follows:
• European integration deviated from its original goal, which is econo-
mic deregulation and liberalisation; since then (the process started
roughly with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty), the EU has been
embracing harmonisation, homogenisation and political integration in
all areas. European integration is undermining the competitiveness of
the Member States, trying to impose an inappropriate social-market
economy (or welfare state) model on them.
• Lisbon Treaty adoption would bring about further and unacceptable
sovereignty pooling and further erode Member State sovereignty.
The EU would become a state in all its ‘fundamental features’; the
European countries would deteriorate into ‘provinces and regions’,
which would lead to gradual weakening and retreat of the nation state
and the simultaneous rise of the ‘post-governmental’ totalitarianism of
particular elites, profiting from European integration.
• Supranational governance through the EU is not legitimate because
there is no European nation or demos, and because democratisation of
the EU through strengthening the European Parliament is impossible
(the social legitimacy thesis).
• Brussels bureaucracy or Brussels dictates, red tape and restrictive
regulations are generally criticised without elaborating examples or
offering solutions.16
In his argumentation, Václav Klaus often formulates inaccurate dichoto-
mies (‘there are only two ways’), for example, either the ‘market economy
without attribute’ or the social-market economy allegedly followed by
most Europeans. These inaccuracies often make him inconsistent in his
statements, as these dichotomies do not match the real development of
European integration and the EU. As such, his line of argumentation is not
19
16 For details, see Rihackova, V. and von Seydlitz, C., Václav Klaus and the Constitutional
Treaty: Czech Euroscepsis or Eurorealism?, Consent Working Paper (2007).
acceptable as a common starting point for discussion with most of his
European counterparts, aside from Eurosceptics.17 In domestic debate, he
often resorts to defaming his foes, both in public debate and in his
writings, in which he often criticises the ‘Europeists’ whom he accuses of
promoting ‘apolitical post-democracy’.18
In the run-up to the EU Presidency, the Czech Government expressed
the view that the President should play a representative role during the
Presidency; however, the scope of his involvement has not been fully
clarified. It seemed he would be entrusted with chairing some of the EU
summits to be held under the Czech Presidency (i.e. the EU–Canada and
EU–Russia summits) or host a dinner for the foreign ministers of EU
Member States and Rio Group countries. The backstage negotiations with
the government and the selection of his EU agenda even took place
throughout the Presidency. Following several cases of foreign policy
divergence between the Czech Government (responsible for policy
formulation under the leadership of Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzen-
berg, nominated by the Greens) and the President, one of the most striking
examples being the summer crisis in Georgia when President Klaus pro-
claimed support for the Russian line, the government being hesitant to
ascribe the President with a greater role. Serving his second term in office
without the possibility of re-election, the President defined his own foreign
policy agenda and stance, enlarging the scope of his competencies beyond
the constitutional framework, his general shift to nationalism, pan-Slavism
and pro-Russian affinities serving in some cases as a background.19
20
17 Like Philippe de Villiers (French MEP) or the traditionally sovereignty-based Danish
Euroscepticism of Jens-Peter Bonde (former MEP).
18 Part of this critique is also contained his argument about ‘NGOism’; ‘…Hence, their [i.e.
the Europeists’] brazen defence of post-democracy and their complacent smile over obsolete
and out-of-date advocates of good old democracy and good old political politics. Since they
are far from citizens (and they like that) and with their macro-view opera glass they do not
see the citizens and do not reach them directly, they need some groups and entities they can
deal with on a large scale (in order to follow them blindly or complicate their life). That is
why they like the corporatist concept of social dialogue, and that is why they want big
business and big trade unions, that is why they want Galbraith’s model of the balance of
powers (at the macro level, not the market functioning at the micro level). Since they do not
want to be accountable to citizens, they like talking to various NGOs, which give them –
they hope so at least – the legitimacy they lack and ‘the voice of the people’, even though
such people are weird. Europeism is a categorical way of being dependent on new things –
would-be progressive, neither retrograde, nor traditional nor conservative. This is why it
puts up with feminism, homosexuality, multiculturalism and with other similar attitudes that
dismantle the long-standing European cultural–civilisation basis’ (Klaus, 2006).
19 For similar reasons, he was outspokenly critical of the recognition of Kosovo by the Czech
Government in May 2008, talking about opening a Pandora’s box.
Besides foreign policy issues, Klaus diverged from the government on
climate change. During the Presidency, he was criticised by the Czech
Minister of the Environment in connection with his visit to the United
States, where he presented his views on climate change in a conference
(early March 2009). Minister of the Environment Martin Bursik20 stated, “I
am sorry to say that in his public appearances Václav Klaus manifests a
combination of activism and amateurism. His dicta (for example, that in
the past decade the planet has been cooling) are bizarre and are not
founded on fact. The observation that, seen from the air, Greenland in the
winter is covered in snow and that this is evidence of the spuriousness of
the arguments concerning the acuteness of climate change, is now just
comical. Unfortunately, Václav Klaus is often perceived as the representati-
ve of the Czech Presidency. It is clear to me that there is no way we can
stop the President, but I consider it necessary to point out that he is a
comic figure worldwide and is definitely damaging the Czech Republic
and its international position.”21
Besides his general Euroscepticism, the main issue raised in connection
with his activity in several debates with the representatives of EU institu-
tions and Member States was the process of ratifying the Lisbon Treaty in
the Czech Republic, often cited by many as a factor discrediting the Czech
Presidency.22 The President proclaimed the Treaty dead right after the Irish
referendum and helped refer the question of ratification and the compliance
of the Treaty with the Czech Constitution to the Constitutional Court in
April 2008. The question was raised by the group of ODS senators loyal to
the former party leader. The Court ruled unanimously in favour of the
compliance of the Treaty with the Czech Constitution on 26 November
2008. Immediately afterwards, President Klaus expressed his dissatisfac-
tion with the outcome and declared he would not sign the Treaty (and thus
conclude the ratification) until the second Irish vote favoured the Treaty.
As the Czech Constitution does not specify any period within which the
President must conclude ratification after the parliamentary vote is taken,
Václav Klaus could effectively obstruct the conclusion of the ratification
process in the Czech Republic even after both chambers of Parliament
have ratified the Treaty.
21
20 Martin Bursik is, apart from being the Minister of the Environment, also the leader of the
Green Party.
21 ‘Martin Bursik to go to Japan and the USA: Copenhagen agreement on climate protection
and emission trading’, Czech Presidency Press Release, 13 March 2009.
22 For example, during the visit of the MEPs, members of the Committee on Constitutional
Affairs in December 2008 to Prague.
At the beginning of the Czech Presidency, President Klaus met members
of the European Commission in the Prague Castle on 7 January and gave a
speech in the European Parliament in February 2009. On 24 March 2009,
the Czech Parliament surprisingly passed a no-confidence vote in the
centre–right government, effectively ending its term in office as well as the
credibility and political leverage of the Czech EU Presidency, prompting
early elections in October 2009 (a caretaker government assumes office on
9 May 2009), a year ahead of those originally planned for 2010. The role
of President Klaus in the process was observed and commented on by
many in the Czech media and elsewhere. With the Lisbon Treaty awaiting
Senate ratification after Chamber of Deputies approval, the move to remove
the government was probably largely inspired by the President’s intention
to prevent the Lisbon Treaty from being ratified23 and partly by his desire
to take control of the Czech Presidency. 
On one hand, by reaching agreement on the caretaker (and ‘apolitical’)
government, part of the government in resignation and the opposition –
ODS, the Greens and CˇSSD – prevented President Klaus from assuming
the key political role in the second half of the Czech Presidency he aspired
to and which he said in the media he was ready to assume. However, given
the personality of the Prime Minister designate – Mr Jan Fischer, former
Head of the Czech Statistical Office – who lacks diplomatic and EU
experience, as well as a clear political mandate and the support of the
coalition that brought him to power, the President will most likely control
the rest of the Czech Presidency and chair the remaining important summit
(the EU–US Summit in June) and the summer European Council. It is
expected that the important agenda items scheduled for the June European
Council will be delayed until the Swedish EU Presidency, including
negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty re-ratification in Ireland, and similarly,
progress on the EU position on the Copenhagen Conference on climate
change. According to diplomatic sources, Sweden has already agreed to
call a special European Council in July to deliberate on future President of
the European Commission, so new European Parliament representatives
could be consulted after assuming office after the June elections. In any
case, President Klaus himself is not experienced in chairing summits of
22
23 One ODS deputy and member of the pro-Klaus faction in the party voting against the
Government, Jan Schwippel, stated to Hospodarske noviny that he voted for no confidence
because of his disagreement with the Lisbon Treaty (‘Jan Schwippel: Rozhodla Lisabonska
smlouva’, Hospodarske noviny, 25 March 2009). The Czech Senate was expected to vote on
the Treaty in May 2009, and PM Topolánek seemed confident that he could convince the
Eurosceptics in his party to get on board by linking approval of the Lisbon Treaty
(see below) with the Missile Defence Treaty (‘radar deal’) supported by the whole ODS.
EU politicians and has very limited personal ties with European leaders.
Most observers expect the June European Council to be an ‘empty’ summit.  
2.3 European policy since the 2006 elections:
the Lisbon Treaty as the main issue
Of the EU issues that emerged after the 2006 elections, ratification of the
Lisbon Treaty was at the heart of Czech domestic debates on the EU. The
government elected in June 2006 with the ODS as a senior ruling party,
replacing the CˇSSD in power, was responsible for negotiating the Lisbon
Treaty text under the German EU Presidency and for signing the docu-
ment. Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek involved the ODS Eurosceptic
wing in the process by appointing its representative, MEP Jan Zahradil, as
Sherpa.24 By this move, the PM prevented the ODS Eurosceptics from
harshly criticising the outcome, though he could not prevent President
Václav Klaus from being openly critical. Some ODS senators, considered
members of the anti-PM stream of the party, in view of their status (i.e.
elected for six years according to a two-round run-off electoral system)
and out of the PM’s direct influence, criticised the Treaty; due to their
opposition, the Senate of the Czech Republic referred the question of
ratification and the compliance of the Lisbon Treaty with the Czech Con-
stitution to the Constitutional Court on 24 April 2008. The ratification pro-
cess in both chambers was stalled. The Senate had six concerns, the three
most important being the interrelationship between the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights and the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and
Basic Freedoms, the transfer of competences under the passerelle clause in
the new Treaty, and the principle of sovereignty. Until the Court’s ruling,
the ratification process was suspended in the Senate and in the Chamber of
Deputies. The Court ruled unanimously in favour of the compliance of the
Treaty with the Czech Constitution on all six points on 26 November
23
24 During Treaty negotiations, the Government’s own initiative was the so-called ‘either-way
flexibility or bidirectional competences transfer’ (the transfer of a competence back to the
Member States from the community level on the basis of unanimity in the European
Council), a principle the Czech Republic wanted to have explicitly mentioned in the Treaty
and succeeded in a very limited form with Declaration No 18 in relation to the delimitation
of competences, which states that a legislative act of the Community can be repealed on the
basis of Art. 241 and that the IGC can be convened to revise the Treaties and restrict
Community competences. Another concern was the Charter of Fundamental Rights: the
Czech Republic succeeded in incorporating a Declaration of the Czech Republic on the
Charter of Fundamental Rights into the body of the Treaty; the declaration refers to
Declaration 18 and the principle of subsidiarity. In particular, other priorities concerned
the red card for the national parliaments (the final compromise was accepted) and QMV
application to new areas, where the Czech Republic opposed applying the procedure,
especially to taxation (however, these issues were also blocked by other Member States,
such as the UK).
2008, enabling ratification to resume. For the Lisbon Treaty to be ratified
according to the Czech system, the document needs to be accepted by
three fifths of the members of both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.
A ‘no’ vote in either of the chambers would end the ratification process.
After their consent, the Treaty needs to be signed by the President. 
The Chamber of Deputies postponed the vote on the Treaty until 3 February
2009, due to ODS instability a few days after the party congress convened
in early December 2008 in response to the disastrous regional election
results.25 Prime Minister Topolánek was challenged by fellow party
members (Pavel Bém and several others) who were President Klaus
supporters. Even though Prime Minister Topolánek was reconfirmed as
party leader, he was probably unsure of the voting behaviour of ODS
deputies regarding the Lisbon Treaty right after the congress. He needed
more time to stabilise the situation and negotiate tradeoffs within his own
party, linking support for the Lisbon Treaty to ratification of the Missile
Defence Treaty26 with the United States and granting, by changing the
rules of procedure and the act regulating the relationship between the two
chambers, both chambers of Parliament the right to approve any further
transfer of competences to the EU. The need to fulfil both conditions was
embodied in the conclusions of the ODS December congress. The Treaty
passed the vote in the Chamber of Deputies on 18 February 2009 with 125
deputies (only 33 of 78 ODS deputies were present) of 197 present voting
for ratification. 
The situation in the Senate was generally more complicated, due to the
dissent concerning Treaty ratification voiced by most ODS senators. After
the November 2008 elections (regional and one third of the Senate), ODS
lost its majority in the Chamber but, with 36 out of 81 senators, remained
the strongest party in the Chamber, followed by CˇSSD with 29 senators.
ODS leadership enjoyed limited influence over the discipline of its repre-
sentatives in the Senate, as they are elected directly, and President Václav
Klaus had traditionally had more support in the Senate. The pro-Lisbon
coalition included 7 senators from KDU–CSL, 6 from the Open Democracy
Club and 29 from CˇSSD; to achieve the 49 votes needed for Treaty
24
25 The party lost almost all Governors’ posts to CˇSSD (13 out of 14). 
26 The Missile Defence Treaty was signed between the US and the Czech Republic in July
2008 and provides a basis for locating a US radar base in the Czech Republic, able to detect
missiles targeted against the United States and its NATO allies. Unlike the Lisbon Treat, the
Missile Defence Treaty is strongly backed by the ODS party and strongly opposed by the
Social Democrats and Communists. At the ODS party congress, Topolánek was bound by
party declaration not to initiate a vote on the Lisbon Treaty in Parliament before the Missile
Defence Treaty.
ratification if all senators were present, the pro-Lisbon camp needed the
votes of at least 7 ODS senators. The vote was scheduled for the May
meeting of the Chamber; at the time of writing (April 2009), it seems that
the Treaty’s chances of passing the vote increased with the fall of the
Topolánek government, since some undecided ODS senators stated that a
‘no’ vote on the Lisbon Treaty, after the political turmoil and loss of Czech
Presidency credibility, would further damage the Czech Republic. The near
certainty of the Lisbon Treaty passing in the Senate was confirmed even
by its staunchest ODS opponents in the Senate.    
After both chambers voted in favour of the Lisbon Treaty, there was the
ultimate obstacle to finalising the ratification: the signature of the
President. The President has three options. First, he can sign the Treaty
without any further delay. Second, he can sign the Treaty and send it to the
Constitutional Court for examination again, which is improbable given the
previous ruling (to initiate a new review, he would have to table new
substantive reasons for one). Third, since the Czech Constitution clearly
states that the President does not have the right to veto an international
treaty adopted by both chambers, but does not specify a deadline for
concluding the ratification process after both chambers’ assent, President
Klaus could postpone the signing ceremony and prolong the finalisation of
the ratification. A parallel can be found in a case of the appointment of
judges, where President Klaus refused to nominate any and was forced to
do so only by Supreme Administrative Court ruling; the entire process
took two years. 
That the Lisbon Treaty was not ratified before the start of the Czech
Presidency was seen by many as diminishing its credibility and legitimacy
in negotiating and brokering EU deals. Czech officials considered this a
utilitarian attitude and a ‘virtual’ problem (as one of them put it, if it was
not the Lisbon Treaty it would be something else). The problem most
closely linked to the issue was that the Czech Presidency would have to
draft the ‘necessary legal safeguards’, enabling the Irish government to
hold a second referendum on the Treaty in the autumn of 2009. These
necessary legal safeguards were supposed to be agreed on at the June
European Council. Since the fall of the government in March, the likeli-
hood of President Klaus chairing this summit has significantly increased
(see above). This creates the paradoxical situation of Klaus leading the
negotiations for the repetition of the Irish vote and possible entry of the
Treaty into force, while opposing it personally. The Member States would
likely move the decision on legal safeguards to an extraordinary summit
held at an early stage of the Swedish Presidency, probably in July 2009.  
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2.4 Internal aspects of the Czech EU Presidency:
from fragile armistice to a political earthquake 
Preparations for the Czech EU Presidency started very gradually in 2005,
long before the last general elections in June 2006. However, the prepara-
tion process slowed down due to the stalemate in the elections and the
inability of political leaders to form a government that would gain majority
support in the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament. The first
minority government led by ODS, appointed by President Klaus in
September 2006, did not win the confidence vote in the lower chamber in
October 2008. It was clear that this government could not lead the Czech
Republic’s EU Presidency. The second chance to create a government was
again entrusted to Mr Topolánek, who put together a coalition of three
parties (ODS, KDU–CSL and SZ).27 President Klaus, however, hesitated in
appointing this government, which he believed lacked stable support in
Parliament; he also did not approve of the designated Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Karel Schwarzenberg. 
The coalition controlled 100 of the 101 votes necessary in the Chamber of
Deputies but, thanks to an agreement28 with two deputies elected for the
Social Democrats (CˇSSD), the newly created government won a vote of
confidence in Parliament.29 The government immediately speeded up
preparations for the EU Presidency, declaring it a priority. However, in do-
ing so, the government primarily focused on necessary reforms in sectors
such as taxes, health care and social services. These reforms were broadly
criticised not only by the opposition (CˇSSD) and KSCˇM) but also by some
of the coalition parties’ representatives. A group of ODS deputies30
argued that the reforms were not profound enough, while two Green Party
deputies31 and one Christian Democratic Party deputy considered the
reforms (especially the health care system reform) too far-reaching. The
stability of coalition was several times weakened by different scandals
26
27 ODS = Civic Democratic Party, KDU–CSL = Christian Democrats, SZ = Greens. 
28 These two deputies left the session of the Chamber of Deputies before the voting, thus
lowering the necessary quorum.
29 CˇSSD leader Ji_í Paroubek accused the coalition of corrupting these deputies; see
http://www.novinky.cz/domaci/106754-dohodnuto-pohanka-a-melcak-nechaji-vladu-
projit.html.
30 This group formed around Deputy Vlastimil Tlusty, one of Topolánek’s main rivals in the
party. This group was constantly changing, though it was considered President Václav
Klaus’s Trojan horse in the party. Vlastimil Tlusty and Jan Schwippel voted in March 2009
against the Government during the confidence vote. Vlastimil Tlusty was later excluded
from the party while Jan Schwippel resigned from the membership.
31 These were Olga Zubova and Vera Jakubkova; in March 2009, they were excluded from the
Green Party.
(KDU–CSL leader Jiri Cunek’s accusation of corruption, interference with
court independence, collection of compromising materials on several
deputies, etc.) and by constant threats from the Green Party that it
would leave the coalition.32 The position of the Government, which never
completely secured the support of Parliament, was therefore very unstable
from the outset. 
The Social Democrats together with the Communists initiated a confidence
vote in Parliament four times before the start of the Presidency. In October
2008, two months before the start of the Czech EU Presidency, CˇSSD
massively won the regional and Senate elections and argued that this was a
kind of a referendum on support for the incumbent government. Although
the Government survived the vote of confidence initiated by CˇSSD in
November, arguing that a loss would endanger the Czech EU Presidency, it
was already clear that it did not have support for further reforms.33 The
regional and Senate elections and the promise of the Prime Minister to
restructure the Government also accelerated diverging tendencies in all
three coalition parties. 
In this situation, ODS tried to negotiate with the Social Democrats for
tolerance of the Government during the EU Presidency. ODS asked CˇSSD
to refrain from initiating another confidence vote and to ‘pair’ them-
selves34 with ministers who are members of the Chamber of Deputies while
officially committed to the EU Presidency. The Social Democrats presented
several conditions under which it was willing to tolerate the Government.
These conditions included early elections in the autumn of 2009, ratifica-
tion of the Lisbon Treaty in both chambers of Parliament by the end of
February and initiation of discussion about when to introduce the Euro.35
Coalition party representatives immediately refused these conditions, citing
early elections as the main obstacle.
The Czech Government took over the EU Presidency in January 2009 at a
time when its existence was anything but guaranteed. Several days after
assuming the Presidency, the Prime Minister announced a government
27
32 Several times, SZ threatened to withdraw from the coalition if their requests were not met
(e.g. regulation of truck transport, hospital reform and their amendment to the Environmen-
tal Impact Assessment Law accepted by the government but subsequently rejected by the
Chamber of Deputies).
33 The Government survived the vote when the ‘rebels’ from ODS and SZ abstained or did not
participate in the voting. 
34 This means that, for each minister not present in Parliament due to serving on the EU Presi-
dency, one deputy from CˇSSD would abstain from voting.
35 http://www.tyden.cz/rubriky/domaci/politika/paroubek-dame-vlade-toleranci-kdyz-pak-zmi-
zi_96872.html.
restructuring but, because only four ministers36 were changed, this was
perceived as cosmetic change.37 Even this change, however, almost resulted
in another crisis over who from the junior coalition partner, the Christian
Democrats, was going to leave the Government.38
After the restructuring, it seemed that the Government would be able to
survive at least the EU Presidency. CˇSSD temporarily reduced its attacks
on the Government and let it focus on managing the EU Presidency. How-
ever, in March 2009, CˇSSD decided to again initiate a vote of confidence
in Parliament, arguing that the Prime Minister was involved in the ‘deputy
Wolf case’.39 On the other hand, this move by CˇSSD might have been
prompted by the results of opinion polls published in early March,
confirming that the popularity of ODS and Prime Minister Topolánek
had risen significantly, thanks to their successful management of the EU
Presidency.40 The confidence vote took place on 24 March 2009, and it was
the first time in Czech history that a standing government was brought
down. The Socialists and Communists were backed by former Green Party
deputies Olga Zubova and Vera Jakubkova41 and by ODS rebels Vlastimil
Tlusty´ and Jan Schwippel. Prime Minister Topolánek, who was constitutio-
28
36 Jiri Cunek – Deputy Prime Minister (leader of KDU–CSL), Dzamila Stehlikova – Minister
for Human Rights (SZ), Ales Rebicek – Minister of Transport (ODS) and Tomas Julinek –
Minister of Health Care (ODS).
37 Even Prime Minister Topolánek said, several days before announcing his decision, that the
change of ministers was no longer crucial (http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/domov/zpravy/
zeleni-trvaji-na-obmene-vlady/354170&id_seznam=).
38 Prime Minister Topolánek was backing Jan Kalousek, Minister of Finance, to stay in the
Government, and was in favour of Christian Democrat Chair Jiri Cunek leaving the
Government. Cunek originally threatened that, if he were pushed to leave, the Christian
Democrats would abandon the Government altogether. The issue was finally decided by the
general conference of the party, which recommended that Cunek leave the Government;
he respected this recommendation. 
39 Deputy Petr Wolf was elected for CˇSSD; he left the party in the summer of 2008, arguing
that he was blackmailed by Party Leader Ji_í Paroubek during the presidential election and
that he was receiving threatening messages because of his support for locating US radar
installations in the Czech Republic (http://domaci.ihned.cz/c1-25741720-wolf-paroubek-
me-vydiral-pri-prezidentske-volbe). This deputy was also investigated by the police on
suspicion of fraud. After leaving CˇSSD, he usually voted together with the coalition.
In March, when Czech Television was preparing coverage of Wolf, the Prime Minister’s clo-
se friend Marek Dalik tried to convince the reporter not to cover the topic. 
40 According to the Median polling company, CˇSSD would gain 38 per cent and ODS 36.4 per
cent; another polling company, CVVM, predicted 36 per cent for CˇSSD and 31.5 for ODS
(http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/ods-dohani-cssd-zeleni-pod-carou/364848 and
http://www.cvvm.cas.cz/upl/zpravy/100882s_pv90318.pdf).
41 These two deputies left the party in November 2008, because of conflict with party leader-
ship. Together with other party members, these two deputies were excluded at the beginning
of March 2009.
nally required to submit his resignation, accused President Václav Klaus of
being the éminence grise of the Government’s failure.
The fact that the Government lost the confidence of Parliament suggests
an interesting observation. The democratic opposition, i.e. the Social De-
mocrats, sacrificed the credibility and reputation of the Czech Republic in
the EU for short-term, domestic political gain. It is unclear whether CˇSSD
really intended to bring down the Government during the EU Presidency,
as the party leadership was surely aware of possible negative consequences
of doing so; in any case, the risk was too great. The fall of the Government
caused the political death of the Presidency and demonstrated that the op-
position in fact did not have any ‘Plan B’. Furthermore, the absence of an
exit strategy opened a window of opportunity for President Klaus to step
in and play a more proactive role on the Czech domestic scene and pos-
sibly also in the Presidency. 
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3 PREPARATION FOR THE PRESIDENCY
3.1 The Presidency priorities and their evolution
The preparation of the Czech Presidency’s priorities started immediately
after the general elections in the summer of 2006. As early as December
2006 the first internal document, ‘Starting points for the priorities of the
Czech Presidency in the Council of the EU in the first half of 2009’, was
presented to the governmental Committee for the EU. After the internal in-
terdepartmental review coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
Committee for the European Union adopted the aforementioned document
in February 2007. The document was later presented to the EU and Foreign
committees of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate, to the social
partners represented in the Council of Economic and Social Agreement, to
the Association of Regions and Union of Towns and Municipalities and to
a limited selection of experts from Czech think-tanks.
This very first version established ‘competitiveness, the four freedoms and
liberal trade policy’ as the main priority areas of the Czech EU Presidency,
completing it with the following important sub-areas:
• Secure and sustainable energy
• Budget reform and Common Agricultural Policy Health Check
• Transatlantic relations, and neighbouring countries in the Western
Balkans and Eastern Europe
• Further development of the area of freedom, security and justice 
• Institutions and their reform, appointment of the European Commis-
sion President and new High Representative for the CFSP.
The document was, however, very general at this stage, as the different prio-
rities were not interconnected and it did not accurately reflect the external
factors under which the Presidency would be executed. The priorities had
domestic political motives in some instances, such as the final clause under-
lining the promotion of national interests during the Presidency.
After input from the aforementioned stakeholders, another round of inter-
nal review and fine tuning, the document was presented to the public un-
der the new title ‘Priority Areas of the Czech Republic’s Presidency in the
Council of the EU in first half of 2009’ in October 2007.
This first public version of the Czech Presidency’s priorities was a much
more developed and coherent document, better reflecting the EU reality.
However, it was still too general and contained too many priorities instead
of focusing on the issues where the Czech ‘added value’ would be most
germane. The document identified five priority areas:
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• A Competitive and Open Europe (still set as the main priority)
• Sustainable and Secure Energy
• A Budget for the Future of Europe
• Europe as a Global Partner
• A Secure and Free Europe
In February 2008, the sectoral priorities of the Czech EU Presidency were
presented. These were prepared on the basis of input from the ministries
responsible for individual Council formations. The Government approved
the sectoral and general priorities in July 2008, and they served as a
basis for the preparation of the final work programme of the Czech EU
Presidency.42
The second version of the document containing the general priorities, entit-
led ‘The Main Priorities of the Czech EU Presidency, 2009’, was substanti-
vely updated from the first draft and its focus reduced to three priorities:
• A Competitive Europe
• Energy and Climate Change
• A Secure and Open Europe
The Czech Government had already anticipated that two of the original
five priorities would not be tackled. These priorities – Budget Reform and
post-Hague programme – were dependent on documents published by the
Commission, which would not be presented before or during the initial
stage of the Czech Presidency. The document also reflected the Irish ‘no’
to the Lisbon Treaty, so one of the Government’s main concerns – the
different scenarios for Lisbon Treaty implementation – had disappeared.
From the end of 2007 and through the first half of 2008, the Government
was negotiating with the French and Swedish Governments regarding the
18-month programme43 of the team presidency. In many issues, such as
enlargement, Eastern Partnership, better regulation, a liberal internal
market and trade agenda, the Czech and Swedish positions were converg-
ing, but it was very difficult to achieve agreement on many issues with the
French Presidency, which chose ‘Protecting Europe’ as its overarching
motto. The role of the Council Secretariat in finding compromise solutions
was thus crucial. This 18-month programme was approved by the General
Affairs and External Relations Council on 16 June 2008 as the lowest
common denominator that satisfied the three upcoming presidencies. 
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42 http://www.euroskop.cz/332/9471/clanek/hlavni-prioritni-oblasti-ceskeho-predsednictvi-eu---
aktualni-informace.
43 http://www.eu2009.cz/en/czech-presidency/pesidency-trio/presidency-trio-776/.
However, the second half of 2008 became lethal for many of the Czech
plans for two main reasons: first, an ‘excessively’ productive and success-
ful French Presidency (see section 3.3) and, second, the ongoing financial
and economic crisis. The final document, entitled ‘Work Programme of the
Czech Presidency: Europe without Barriers’,44 was presented on 6 January
2009, a few days after the start of Czech EU Presidency. This document
already reflected the ongoing economic crisis, the fight against which has
become the first priority of the Presidency, and the fact that the French
Presidency had already finished negotiating the energy–climate package
and the CAP Health Check. The work programme now had three priorities,
the ‘3 Es’, i.e. the Economy, Energy and Europe in the World. 
Understandably, particularly given economic conditions, the originally
complex and ambitious programme calling for more trade liberalisation
and consistent promotion of the liberal market economy, was essentially
reduced to two points: first, fighting the global financial and economic
crisis and, second, fighting the ‘new protectionism’ represented by French
President Nicolas Sarkozy and, to some extent, also by the new US
administration. Although at this stage the Czechs already understood
that the economic crisis would be issue number one, in this respect the
preparations were insufficient, as none of the ideas was on the table and
the presidency was  pushed towards taking more active approach by other
member states, particularly Germany and France. 
In the energy area, the priorities had to be tailored to the new situation, as
the energy–climate package had already been approved during the French
Presidency. The gas crisis at the beginning of the Czech Presidency further
reshuffled the priorities. The external dimension of energy security (includ-
ing the Southern Corridor Summit), together with EU preparation for the
Copenhagen Climate Summit, became the most important issues. 
In the area of external relations, the Eastern Partnership has gradually
become the focal point, with the Government determined to turn the
inauguration summit into a visible footprint of the Czech Presidency. The
start of relations with the new US administration also stayed high on the
agenda, and the informal EU summit with President Obama was supposed
to mark a new era of transatlantic cooperation. On the other hand, the
enlargement process and especially the Western Balkans dropped in
importance to the Presidency, as many objective factors hampered Czech
efforts in the area (see section 4.3.2).
32
44 http://www.eu2009.cz/en/czech-presidency/programme-and-priorities/programme-and-
priorities-479/.
However, in the context of the turbulence on the Czech political scene and
the fall of the Government in March 2009, it seems that the main focus of
the Czech Presidency for the rest of this term could well be to ‘minimise’
the damage caused by these unfavourable developments and to keep a very
low profile. 
3.2 Administrative preparations and coordination
framework45
The presiding countries differ in the extent to which they involve different
intra-state actors dealing with European issues in the Presidency organisa-
tion and management. Two different approaches can be distinguished. The
first one focuses on the division of powers within a Member State and can
be further divided into three models, centralised, decentralised and a com-
bination of the two.46 The second approach concentrates on the role of the
central institutions and the Permanent Representation to the EU in manag-
ing the Presidency. In the capital-based model, the main responsibility rests
with the nation-state centre, while a Brussels-based model stipulates that
the Permanent Representation plays a key role.47 Initially, it was not clear
which model the Czech Republic would choose. 
In the first phase of preparations in 2005, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs became the main coordination body, but the role of the Permanent
Representation was not explicitly defined. The situation did not become
much clearer after the 2006 general elections. In November 2006, the
minority government approved the establishment of a new post: govern-
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45 The section draws on Rihackova, V. and Kasakova, Z, The Czech 2009 EU Council
Presidency: A Starting Point Assessment’ (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Prague, 2008).
46 In the centralised model, the centre, usually the Office of the Government or the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, is entrusted with powers to coordinate and manage the EU Presidency;
the other actors have to follow their decisions in all aspects of the Presidency’s administra-
tion. In the decentralised model, ministries and Permanent Representation to the EU possess
great autonomy in managing the Presidency, in which representatives of regions, other
institutions and authorities of state administration are involved as well. The model
combining both centralised and decentralised models almost puts the other actors on the
same footing as the centre. The central coordination unit coordinates the preparations for
and execution of the Presidency, while individual ministries bear responsibility for
organising meetings within their scope. Permanent Representation also plays a significant
role in the coordination mechanism, carrying out functions such as chairing EU Council
meetings; see Rihackova and Kasakova (2008).
47 See Tomalova, E., ‘Koordinacni mechanismus predsednictví CR v Rade EU’ [Coordination
mechanism of the Czech EU Presidency], in: Karlas, J et al., Jak predsedat Evropske unii?
Navrh priorit predsednictvi CR v Rade EU v roce 2009 (Institute of International Relations,
Prague 2008), pp. 121–135.
ment secretary for the coordination of the Czech Presidency.48 The co-
ordination mechanism changed significantly at the beginning of 2007
when the new coalition government of ODS, KDU–CSL and the Greens
was established, including the new post of Deputy Prime Minister for
European Affairs. Alexandr Vondra, who filled this post, was put in charge
of EU matters in general, specifically responsible for preparing for and
managing the Presidency. The Office of the Government of the Czech
Republic thus took responsibility for the Czech Presidency from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and became the central coordination
unit. The position of the government secretary for the coordination of the
Czech Presidency was abolished. In 2007, the process of transferring
powers for coordinating the EU agenda from MFA to the Office of the
Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs proceeded, including changes
at the Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the EU.
The Government decided to change the Ambassador of the Permanent
Representation and appointed Milena Vicenová to this post in September
2007 (in office since January 2008).49
In relation to these changes, a management model based on a combination
of centralised and decentralised models was adopted. This ensured central
management of the Presidency while leaving a certain degree of autonomy
to the ministries in terms of organisation and preparations for the Presidency.
It also involved the regions and the Permanent Representation, the main
responsibility resting with the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for
European Affairs. The chosen model sought to combine the advantages of
both the centralised and decentralised models. In reality, however, some
tensions between the Office of the Government and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and in relation to individual ministries, occurred in the
course of Presidency preparations. In addition to the ensuring organisa-
tional and logistical part of the Presidency, the Deputy Prime Minister
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48 Zdenek Hruby should have assumed this post in January 2007 and concurrently held the
function of Minister without Portfolio in the Government; the Czech EU Presidency should
have been closely connected to the Office of the Government. 
49 Government of the Czech Republic Resolution No 1238 on the coordination mechanism for
the preparations and execution of the Czech EU Presidency, 25 October 2006; Government
of the Czech Republic Resolution No 1239 on the change of the Statute of the Committee
for the EU, 25 October 2006; Government of the Czech Republic Resolution No 273 on the
activities of the Government Secretary for the Coordination of the Czech Presidency and
Executive Secretariat, 3 January 2007; Government of the Czech Republic Resolution No
39 on the Appointment of the Deputy Prime Minister on European Affairs, 9 January 2007;
Government of the Czech Republic Resolution No 58 on the activities of the Office of the
Deputy Prime Minister on the European Affairs, 17 January 2007; Government of the
Czech Republic Resolution No 1061 to the motion to change the head of the Permanent
Representation of the Czech Republic to the EU, 12 September 2007.
for European Affairs was responsible for publicity and communication
with the media and the Council.50 The Concept for Communication and
Presentation of the Czech EU Presidency was approved in July 2007. 
The changes in the management of the Czech EU Presidency influenced
the role and structure of the Committee for the EU. This governmental
working body, which became the main unit charged with formulating
political and strategic priorities of the Presidency, was divided into two
levels. The Committee at the governmental level consisted of ministers and
was chaired by the Prime Minister or by the Deputy Prime Minister for
European Affairs and also involved associate members, such as the
Chancellor of the Office of the President51 or the Governor of the Czech
National Bank (in an advisory role). The head of the Permanent Represen-
tation of the Czech Republic in Brussels participated in the meetings as
well via videoconference. The task of the Committee was to adopt basic
strategic materials and formulate political priorities. It also approved
instructions and mandates for the Prime Minister and his European Council
delegations. The Committee at the working level was chaired by the Deputy
Prime Minister for European Affairs or by one of his deputies and com-
prised the deputy ministers and the Permanent Representation head. It was
responsible for coordination and agenda setting for the various composi-
tions of the Council, and adopted the instructions for COREPER.52 The
Office of the Government did not coordinate organisational arrangements
for the Czech Presidency at the individual ministries responsible for the
individual Councils’ agenda formation, expert meetings, preparation of the
accompanying delegation programmes, delegation monitoring, updating of
the Presidency website and employee training in issues concerning the EU
and the Presidency. Each ministry established a ministerial coordination
group. The Czech Permanent Representation was also affected by the
changes in the EU affairs management: it remained institutionally sub-
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50 There are two sections and one department at the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for
European Affairs: the Czech EU Presidency Section managed by Jana Hendrichova, the
European Affairs Section managed by Marek Mora and the European Affairs Information
Department. The Czech EU Presidency Section deals with logistics and coordination of the
Presidency. The Czech Republic hosted 11 informal meetings of the Council, two thirds of
which were held outside Prague, and approximately 160 meetings at lower political and
expert levels. The European Affairs Section has been engaged in setting the agenda and
formulating Presidency priorities. 
51 The advisory role of President’s Chancellor in the Committee was the only official 
hannel through which President Klaus was involved in preparing for and coordinating the
Presidency. 
52 Government of the Czech Republic Resolution No 1239 amending the Statute of the
Committee for the EU, 25 October 2006; Government of the Czech Republic Resolution
No 148 on the Statute of the Committee for the EU, 25 February 2008.
ordinated to the MFA, but managed both by MFA and the Office of the
Deputy Prime Minister. 
Another actor involved in preparing for and executing the Presidency was
the Czech Parliament. Each chamber of Parliament – the Chamber of
Deputies and the Senate – has its own EU committee, and these cooperate
with each other only in coordination meetings. No common body was
established in relation to the Czech Presidency. Cooperation at the political
level was not initially very good, but improved as preparations for the
Presidency intensified. The Government regularly updated the EU com-
mittees on the progress of the Presidency preparations and consulted them
on Presidency priorities and setting the calendar of activities. In relation to
the Presidency, Parliament did not possess any special powers.53
Because of the Presidency, the public administration was temporarily rein-
forced by 365 employees. The staff of the Permanent Representation of the
Czech Republic in Brussels increased by 110 people to 220.54 Civil
servants involved in preparing for and executing the Presidency had to
demonstrate a certain level of knowledge of English, French and EU issues
(e.g. decision-making process and legislative procedures).55 The Institute of
State Administration at the Ministry of Interior was responsible for educa-
ting and training civil servants in all aspects of the EU Presidency via a
national educational programme in force since January 2006. The Institute
closely cooperated with various foreign organisations, such as the Institute
of Public Administration in Ireland and the Centre for European Negotia-
tion and Decision-making in Brussels. 
As far as financial matters go, the Government allocated CZK 1.9 billion
(approximately EUR 71.5 million) for managing the Czech Presidency in
the 2007–2009 period (i.e. CZK 200 million for 2007, CZK 700 million
for 2008 and CZK 1 billion for 2009). These resources were primarily
allocated for coordination, security, civil servant training and strengthening
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53 During the Presidency, Parliament was responsible for organising the Conference of
Community and European Affairs Committees of the Parliaments of the EU (COSAC),
joint meetings of parliamentary committees in Prague, the Joint Parliamentary Meeting in
Brussels and other accompanying events.
54 In the Czech Republic, the biggest increase was recorded at the ministries of Foreign Affairs
and of Agriculture. These posts and positions were to terminate by the end of 2009, but
some suggest that there is pressure to keep some of these employees in service, especially
in the MFA.
55 Initially, in January 2006, the Government proposed that all civil servants involved should
speak fluent French; the initiative of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cyril Svoboda,
caused negative reactions at some ministries; it was then left with the individual ministries
to decide.
state administration. Other resources amounting to CZK 1.4 billion
(approximately EUR 52.5 million) were set aside for the individual
ministries. The Czech regions involved in cultural or other accompanying
events financed these activities from their own resources. The Ministry of
Finance was directly responsible for the distribution and control of funds
allocated for the Presidency.
3.3 Context of the Czech EU Presidency:
External Factors 
Apart from rather complicated internal variables, the performance of the
Czech Presidency has been largely influenced by the external factors in the
EU and on the world scene generally. In the EU, the three most important
factors affecting the Czech leadership have been the ending of the European
Commission term, upcoming elections to the European Parliament and the
strong role of the preceding French Presidency. 
The current Barroso Commission’s term of office is about to terminate on
31 October 2009 under the Swedish Presidency. It is quite typical for the
Commission to take a much lower profile towards the end of its term, and
this has been the case with the current college. Three commissioners –
Franco Frattini, Markos Kyprianou and Peter Mandelson – have already
left the college to take government posts back in their Member States. The
European press often refers to the Barroso Commission at this stage as a
‘lame duck’. 
The relationship between the Czech Presidency and the European Commis-
sion, particularly President Barroso, has been also strained on several
fronts. First, some controversies had already appeared in the run-up to
the Czech Presidency in 2008, when the Czech Government embarked on
bilateral negotiations with the United States on joining the Visa Waiver
Program (VWP), guaranteeing the visa-free regime for Czech citizens
visiting the United States. The Commission argued strongly that it should
play a leading role in the negotiations, claiming that the same conditions
have to be negotiated for the other new Member States of the EU currently
not in the programme (i.e. all the countries that joined in 2004 and 2007
except Slovenia and Greece). This was despite the fact that the United
States signalled quite openly that they would deal with the EU countries
case by case and not collectively. The impact on the Czech Presidency was
that the Commission decided not to table the proposal to follow up the
Hague Programme under the Czech Presidency, which was originally
expected to be one of the Presidency’s priorities, and instead leave it until
the Swedish Presidency. Many officials in Prague believe that the Commis-
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sion did this to ‘punish’ the Czech Republic for pursuing unilateral
negotiations with the United States on visa waiver provisions. 
The other factor is the careful approach of Commission President Barroso
on issues pertinent to the economic crisis. Normally, the Commission
(especially given its current political profile) would strongly back the
Czech Presidency in its attempts to fight protectionism and achieve further
liberalisation in the internal market. However, as this issue has become
highly politicised and controversial in the EU due to poor economic
performance, particularly in the major EU economies, the Commission is
unwilling to antagonise those big players, particularly France, by too
strong pro-liberal rhetoric, let alone policy initiatives. This can also be
explained by the fact that Barroso will likely seek reappointment as the
President of the next Commission, and will need the support of the biggest
EU countries. 
However, the European Commission’s lack of activity is also evident on
other fronts where the Czech Presidency expected to make progress. For
example, the Czechs were hoping to launch negotiations on the post-2013
budgetary framework on the basis of the mid-term budgetary review
published by the Commission at the beginning of 2009. By now, however,
it is clear that the document will appear in the second half of 2009 at the
earliest, so the Council will start discussing budgetary reform no earlier
than under the Swedish Presidency. 
On the other hand, the alignment between the Presidency and the Commis-
sion has been better on other fronts, particularly in the area of energy
security. During the Russia–Ukraine gas dispute in January 2009, the
Presidency and the Commission acted in tandem and spoke with one voice,
the Czech Presidency actually leaving quite a strong role to Energy
Commissioner Piebalgs. 
As for the role of the European Parliament, the Europe-wide election to
this body during the term of the Presidency means that legislative activity
draws to a close around April 2009. This implies that there will be signi-
ficantly less legislation than under a normal Presidency, which has to do
with both the final term of the European Commission and the involvement
of MEPs in the upcoming election campaigns. The impact on the execution
of the Presidency in this case is arguably less important, as the European
legislative process is quite protracted, from Commission proposal to the
adoption of legislation via the co-decision procedure, and is rarely completed
in a single Presidency term. Contrary to these expectations, legislative
activity was still quite vibrant in the first months of the Presidency, the
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Council and Parliament having reached a compromise on several important
pieces of legislation (see section 3.1). In light of the government crisis in
Prague, both institutions have also made a political deal that the nomina-
tion procedure for the next Commission President will start at an extra-
ordinary European Council convened early under the Swedish Presidency,
as the caretaker government in Prague will not have the necessary political
leverage to negotiate compromise over the future boss of the Commis-
sion.56 The Parliament accepted this solution, as its bodies (factions and
committees) will be still in a process of formation and it would be easier
to involve them in the negotiations at a later stage. 
The third and perhaps most important variable for the Czech Presidency is
the legacy of its predecessor, France, and particularly of its president,
Nicolas Sarkozy. The tensions appeared early on when preparing for the
joint team presidency programme. This is clear even from the choice of
motto: while the French singled out ‘Protecting Europe’ as their over-
arching priority, the Czechs opted for ‘Europe without barriers’, the two
seemingly in direct contradiction. The preparation of the joint programme
has thus been handed over to the Secretariat General of the Council and
can be largely seen as the lowest common denominator.
It is beyond doubt that French President Sarkozy has turned out to be a
highly determined leader, and he demonstrated that to some extent he
would like to continue ‘running the show’ even during the Czech term.
Several things illustrate this. First, Sarkozy was quite eager to finish
negotiations on the big issues on the EU agenda, such as the CAP Health
Check or the energy–climate package during the French term, not leaving
these issues to the Czechs. It remains questionable whether this was due to
his determination to show off his negotiation and leadership capacities, or
whether it was rather due to a certain uncertainty that the Czech leaders
would be able to broker a Europe-wide deal. He also signalled that he
would not like to give up on the idea of retaining informal leadership of
the Union for the Mediterranean, considered his brainchild.57 Sarkozy also
strongly advocated coordinating the response of the Eurozone countries to
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56 Another justification is that President Klaus might be in charge of chairing the June
European Council, which might be even a worse scenario in terms of the desired outcome. 
57 The Czech weekly Reflex published the transcript of a meeting between Nicolas Sarkozy
and Mirek Topolánek where Sarkozy pleads with Topolánek to leave him an informal EU
leadership role (jointly with Egypt) for the Union for the Mediterranean in exchange for an
informal role for the Czech Republic in the Eastern Partnership. The information ‘leaked
out’ from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was penalised for this by the National
Security Authority (http://zpravy.idnes.cz/diplomacie-dostala-pokutu-za-unik-hovoru-
sarkozyho-s-topolankem-pyc-/domaci.asp?c=A090126_142552_krimi_lf).
the global economic crisis, including organising informal Eurozone
summits, which would probably leave him with additional leverage during
the team presidency, as both the Czech Republic and Sweden are outside
the Euro area. Similarly, there was a clash over the invitation of President
Obama: while the Czechs signalled their intention to organise an informal
EU-27 summit with President Obama in early April 2009, the French
invited the US President to Paris for the G20 meeting scheduled for 15
February 2009,58 after the official invitation was discussed between Sarko-
zy and Topolánek. Prague regarded all these moves as attempts to under-
mine Czech Presidency leadership in various policy areas, and were reflec-
ted on quite negatively by many Czech politicians and the Czech press. 
Much scepticism about the Czech Presidency has also been articulated by
the French press, both at the ending of the French term and in the course
of the Czech Presidency. The two major French dailies, Le Monde and Le
Figaro, have criticised the Czech Presidency (and the European Commis-
sion) for lack of action, especially regarding the economic crisis, essentially
advocating the need for informal leadership in that area from the biggest
European economies, i.e. Germany, France and Britain. Le Figaro
also made comparisons with the visibility of the EU during the French
Presidency, claiming that Europe was ‘mute’ under the Czech Presidency.59
The row between Paris and Prague escalated at the end of February 2009,
when Nicolas Sarkozy, in an interview on French television, attacked the
delocalisation of French companies to lower-cost countries, specifically
referring to the Toyota–Peugeot–Citroën (TPCA) joint venture in the Czech
Republic.60 Although not directly linked to the Presidency agenda, the
Czech press and Czech politicians have interpreted this comment as a desire
to resort to protectionism.61 Prime Minister Topolánek also put Sarkozy’s
remarks in the context of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in the Czech
Republic, warning that such statements could jeopardise the ratification
process.62
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58 This point was raised during a trilateral meeting between J.-P. Joyuet, A. Vondra and
K. Schwarzenberg in Paris on 8 November 2008: http://zpravy.idnes.cz/nekdo-se-nas-
snazi-skrtat-stezoval-si-vondra-na-obchazeni-ceska-pvn-/domaci.asp?c=
A090109_174305_domaci_adb
59 http://www.rozhlas.cz/evropskaunie/zajimavosti/_zprava/542309.
60 In the interview, Sarkozy proclaimed that it is ‘unjustifiable that a certain unnamed
producer makes cars in the Czech Republic and they are then sold in France’. 
61 It was described as such by, for example, Minister of Industry and Trade Martin Rˇíman and
Deputy Prime Minister for EU Affairs Alexandr Vondra.
62 http://www.tyden.cz/rubriky/domaci/politika/topolanek-sarkozy-promluvil-o-autech-a-
ohrozil-lisabon_104486.html.
The clashes between France and the Czech Republic, which escalated to
almost open animosity in February 2009, of course did not go unnoticed
across Europe. Although both Sarkozy and Topolánek were trying to play
them down, the foreign ministers of both countries, Bernard Kouchner and
Karel Schwarzenberg, agreed to meet twice weekly to coordinate their
positions and prevent any clashes being taken up by the media.63 The fact
of this agreement, however, simply indicates the extent to which France
had still kept its clout over Presidency business during the Czech term. 
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63 http://www.loh.cz/ceske-predsednictvi/46528-kouchner-a-schwarzenberg-se-budou-
pravidelne-schazet/.
4 PRIORITIES OF THE PRESIDENC
4.1 Economy
Economic issues were top Czech EU Presidency priorities from the very
beginning. The Czech Government had an ambitious plan to promote further
liberalisation via the Common Trade Policy (liberalisation of international
trade in the WTO framework) and competitiveness (e.g. mainly by further
strengthening of the Lisbon Strategy and the four freedoms, including the
further deregulation of services and eliminating transitional periods for the
free movement of workers in all EU Member States).
First, the financial and later the economic crisis completely reshuffled these
priorities, and the Czech EU Presidency suddenly found itself in the lead-
ing position to tackle the consequences of both crises. From its anticipated
role, in which the Presidency mainly expected to manage discussions of
the future development of the EU single market, the Lisbon Strategy, better
regulation, the EU budget and other economic issues, the Presidency had
become the crisis manager of the whole EU and, through formulating the
common European position for the G20 summit, in the global environment
as well.
Already during the French Presidency, when it was mainly the financial
crisis that resonated in the vocabulary of world leaders, the Czech Govern-
ment had decided to focus on fighting plans for very strong regulation of
financial institutions and markets. The Czech Government negotiated a
place in the French delegation during the G20 summit in New York at the
end of 2008, to gain firsthand experience of such an event. Together with
the deepening of the financial crisis and its gradual conversion into an
economic crisis, several voices in the EU (i.e. France and Great Britain)
and outside (the US) started to call for protectionism. That was the
moment when the Czech EU Presidency shifted its focus to fight to preserve
the status quo related to the EU’s single barrier-free market, liberal trade
policy and level of regulation, instead of trying to promote a more liberal
and free environment in these areas. Alongside this, Czech Prime Minister
Mirek Topolánek strongly criticised the statement of French President
Nicolas Sarkozy, that car producers should repatriate investments and
jobs to France (specifically citing an automotive company in the Czech
Republic). Topolánek strictly opposed this call, warning that the words of
President Sarkozy could have consequences for Czech ratification of the
Lisbon Treaty. This criticism set the tone for the ensuing actions of the
Czech Presidency during negotiations at the informal European Council
meeting in Prague and the European Council regular meeting in March
2009.
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The Czech Presidency also decided to immediately organise two extra-
ordinary European Council meetings: one in March to discuss the way
out of the economic crisis and to end the pledges for more protectionism,
and a second one in May to find solutions to increasing unemployment
throughout the EU.64 The decision to organise an extraordinary economic
summit was also made in response to requests from French President
Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. 
The summit itself can be considered the greatest success of the Czech
Presidency. Prime Minister Topolánek obtained a promise from the leaders
of the biggest EU Member States to refrain from measures that could
undermine the European single market or harm other EU countries. The
European Council also stressed that ‘protectionism is not an answer to the
current crisis’ and accepted the request of the new EU Member States to
be considered separately.65 European leaders also reiterated their intention
to coordinate all measures (such as car-scrapping schemes and banking
system recovery measures) at the European level. The summit also seems
to have shown the French President that his term as President of the
European Council had well and truly ended in December 2008.
Even greater success came with the regular spring summit of the European
Council, focusing mainly on economic issues, especially on implementing
the European Recovery Plan adopted in December 2008 under the French
Presidency (this Plan allocated EUR 400 billion for the recovery of the EU
economy in 2009–2010), and on preparing the EU position for the G20
summit in London in April. The heads of states confirmed that all the
measures were temporary and that after the crisis, the usual Growth and
Stability Pact mechanisms would again apply. They also reiterated that any
national-level measures could not in any case infringe on the single market
rules.
Concerning the strengthening of financial market regulation and of institu-
tions such as rating agencies, the European Council decided that only
regulation, which is anti-cyclic, should be introduced. This decision was
further elaborated on during the informal ECOFIN meeting at the begin-
ning of April 2009 in Prague, where ministers accompanied by central
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64 The ‘unemployment summit’ has been downgraded to a Troika meeting with social partners
later on; http://www.epc.eu/en/pub.asp?TYP=TEWN&LV=187&see=y&t=&PG=
TEWN/EN/detailpub&l=12&AI=957.
65 This call came mainly from the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, which were not
facing problems of fiscal stability, as were Hungary and the Baltic states, and would be
automatically labelled as ‘problematic’ Central and Eastern European states should the
package be adopted.
bank governors ‘singled out the excessive focus on the supervision of
individual financial market institutions and the related neglect of systemic
risks as shortcomings of the current system’.66 To cope with systematic
risks, they agreed to create the European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC), a
new body in charge of supervising the macro-financial stability of the EU
single market. The ESRC will collect and analyse information and issue
risk warnings and recommendations at the macro-finance level. On the
other hand, the supervision of individual institutions operating in financial
markets should remain mainly the responsibility of Member States and
should be complemented by the European System of Financial Supervision
(ESFS)67 with rather limited powers. 
The Czech Government considers the spring European Council meeting to
have been a ‘summit of results’,68 and Jose Manuel Barroso sees it as a
‘summit of delivery’.69 Altogether, the summit distributed more than EUR
130 billion, including:
• EUR 5 billion for individual infrastructure development projects to
increase energy security (including EUR 200 million for the Nabucco
project) and support IT-related innovations
• EUR 50 billion to increase the guarantee to help countries facing
payment balance problems
• EUR 75 billion as a voluntary loan to the International Monetary
Fund
• EUR 600 million to finance projects conducted in the Eastern
Partnership framework.
The European leaders also rejected the American call to take ‘permanent
action’ and pump hundreds of billions more euros into the world economy.
Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek even called these American go-
vernment initiatives a ‘road to hell’ in his speech in the European Parlia-
ment on 25 March 25, 2009.70
44
66 http://www.eu2009.cz/en/news-and-documents/news/ministers-and-governors-agree-on-
principles-for-financial-supervision-reform-15504/.
67 The European System of Financial Supervision will be created by transforming the existing
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), Committee of European Securities
Regulators (CESR) and Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Supervisors (CEIOPS) into new European bodies and granting them additional powers.
68 http://www.eu2009.cz/en/news-and-documents/news/mid-term--14981/.
69 http://www.epc.eu/en/pub.asp?TYP=TEWN&LV=187&see=y&t=&PG=
TEWN/EN/detailpub&l=12&AI=957.
70 http://www.eu2009.cz/en/news-and-documents/news/mirek-topolanek:-european-union-
takes-unprecedented-steps-to-combat-the-crisis-13468/.
Without much publicity, another major proposal calling for EUR 190
billion of aid to the financial sector in Central and Eastern Europe and for
relaxed Euro adoption criteria, proposed by Hungarian Prime Minister
Ferenc Gyurcsány, was strictly refused, not only by the Czech Presidency,
but also by the other Visegrad states, Poland and Slovakia71; surprisingly,
however, it was supported by Germany.72
The summit also agreed on a common position for the G20 summit in
London at the beginning of April; this position, however, was quite general
and cited few concrete figures. The measures to be supported were actually
all headed in the same direction: more regulation and stimulus to the
global economy. The G20 summit itself was more influenced by Great
Britain, France and Germany than by the Czech EU Presidency, however,
which underlined the need to resist the ‘new protectionism’ and intended
new barriers to international trade. On the other hand, the summit agreed
to invest USD 1.1 trillion in the global economy and to foster the super-
vision of financial institutions and markets through establishing a new
Financial Stability Board (FSB) with a strengthened mandate.73
The Czech EU Presidency also facilitated compromise on the amended list
of items (mainly highly labour-intensive, locally provided services) that
could benefit from the reduced value-added tax. This list was approved at
the ECOFIN Council meeting on 10 March 2009 after years of discussion.
The list includes a highly controversial reduced VAT rate on dining
services, which is supposed to have a positive effect on employment.
So far, the Czech Presidency has also managed to negotiate several major
legislative proposal compromises with the European Parliament:
• The Third Energy Package, which regulates the rules for the
functioning of the energy market, creates clearer conditions for invest-
ment in the energy sector, the interconnectivity of networks and
improves the position of consumers;
• The Aviation Package, which will tear down the existing barriers in
air traffic in the EU, reduce flight distance and duration, reduce fuel
consumption and carbon dioxide emissions, remove one of the causes
of flight delays and create room for fare reductions;
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71 http://domaci.ihned.cz/c3-34987930-002G00_d-madarsko-znovu-zada-o-pomoc-pro-
12-zemi-az-190-miliard.
72 http://www.epc.eu/en/pub.asp?TYP=TEWN&LV=187&see=y&t=&PG=
TEWN/EN/detailpub&l=12&AI=957
73 https://londonsummit-stage.londonsummit.gov.uk/en/summit-aims/summit-communique/.
• The Road Package, which will simplify access to the road transport
(passenger and freight) market and remove the administrative burden
put on carriers and unjustified barriers to entering the international
market; 
• The Social Security Coordination Package, which will facilitate
citizens’ mobility throughout the EU, speed up the processing of
applications by people who live abroad, remove certain barriers and
modernise the exchange of information among authorities in 27
Member States; 
• The Eco-label, Eco-design and EMAS, which will lead to a further
expansion of energy-efficient products and services that are friendlier
to the environment and remove administrative burdens and facilitate
trade inside the EU; 
• The GSM Directive, which will remove futile legislation and facilitate
the development of the most modern information and communication
technologies;  
• The Solvency II Directive, which replaces legislation that is three
decades old and that will significantly change the form of the insurance
sector. It had been discussed for several years. Its main contribution is
that it increases requirements as to the capital adequacy of insurance
companies and introduces an early warning system with regard to a
lack of capital that could harm insured clients. 
• The Roaming Regulation, thanks to which the rates for voice
roaming, SMS to and from EU countries and data roaming will be
reduced by 2012.74
As the legislative activity of the European Parliament will wind down in
April 2009, it is unrealistic to expect further achievements in this area.
4.2 Energy and climate change
The ODS-led government identified energy and climate change as among
the top priorities of the Czech EU Presidency, energy being one of
the ‘three Es’ (Economy, Energy and Europe in the World) defining the
Presidency programme. Emphasis on the issue was somewhat determined
by the general context: energy and climate change has become a looming
issue with two major components – the post-Kyoto negotiations (the
Copenhagen Conference in December 2009 and the EU mandate) and the
energy–climate package – and final negotiations on the EU third energy
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74 ‘The Czech Presidency at Mid-Term’ (self-evaluation of the Czech Presidency)
http://www.eu2009.cz/en/news-and-documents/news/mid-term--14981/.
liberalisation package. The Czech Government itself particularly emphasised
external energy security, believing that ‘a genuine external energy policy is
not thinkable without a strong single energy market. The two complement
each other and cannot be separated’.75 The importance of the climate change
agenda, however, declined slightly before the Czech Presidency started,
since the major deal was done at the end of the French Presidency.76 The
gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009 then raised the pro-
file external energy security, a number one Czech priority, to the detriment
of other issues. 
External energy security
The Czech Republic chaired and concluded discussions of the second
Strategic Energy Review (19 February 2009) and launched discussion of
positions on the 2010–2014 Energy Action Plan, focusing mainly on the
external dimension of energy security. In reaction to the January 2009
Russia–Ukraine gas crisis, the Czech Presidency pushed for a review of
strategic energy infrastructure and of the networks of major producing and
transit countries, advocated review of the rules for creating oil contingency
stocks and raised the issue of energy solidarity. The Czech Presidency
strongly supported these ideas as applicable to all energy commodities –
gas, oil and electricity.  
The spring European Council (19–20 March 2009) Conclusions77 approved
the initiatives mentioned in the Strategic Energy Review, explicitly under-
lining the energy infrastructure development and calling on the Commis-
sion to table draft measures for achieving the priority goals of the review
and to propose a new EU tool for energy security and infrastructure at the
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75 Statement by Deputy Prime Minister Alexandr Vondra, ‘Energy Security as a Priority of the
EU Presidencies’, at ANO pro Evropu — Energy Forum (international conference), 
November 2007. 
76 The so-called energy–climate package was assumed to be one of the most important issues
the Czech Republic would deal with during its EU Presidency. The revised ETS was being
negotiated under the French Presidency and the final deal was hammered out at the
December 2008 European Council. The generally accepted compromise was ideal for the
Czechs and their interests (including energy producers and other business stakeholders).
Many observers claim that the deal was a relief for the Czech Government, due to its lack
of internal consensus on the issue, i.e. conflict both within the Government (the Green Party
vs. ODS and/or the Ministry of Environment vs. Ministry of Industry and Trade) and
between Czech interest groups (i.e. energy companies and industrial sector unions vs.
environmental groups). During the negotiations for the package, the Czech Republic also
allied itself with ‘trouble makers’ such as Poland and Italy, which would not add credibility
to its position of honest broker on the issue. The views of Czech President Václav Klaus on
climate change would have called the Presidency’s credibility in the field of climate change
further into question on the international scene. 
77 Council of the EU, Presidency Conclusions, 7880/09, 20 March 2009.
beginning of 2010. In addition, the European Council underlined the need
for new EU crisis mechanisms and for securing supply guarantees from
supplying and transit countries. It was decided that the Commission would
table and the Council would review the legislative proposals regarding gas
supplies, including the crisis mechanism and regional plans for securing
supplies (including solidarity among Member States) by the end of 2009.
The European Council also emphasised the diversification of energy
supplies and corridors and stressed the growing importance of energy issues
in EU’s external relations, while the Commission was called on to
table draft measures for developing the Southern Corridor, including a
mechanism for accessing Caspian gas by the end of 2009. The European
Council also redefined situations and issues to be tackled at the Community
level in relation to energy security, though no legal specifications were
suggested. 
During the spring European Council meeting, a package of EUR 5 billion
was approved to support European economic recovery, energy infrastructure
projects being at the heart of the plan. The Czech Presidency, supported by
the Member States from Central and Eastern Europe, reached a deal that
restored the Nabucco project to the list of explicitly mentioned items for
financial investment (Germany being a major opponent) and allocated
EUR 1.5 billion to improve the interconnectivity of Member State gas
pipelines. The total amount allocated to energy infrastructure projects
reached EUR 4 billion. ‘It is a clear reaction of the EU, the Presidency and
the Commission to the gas crisis,’ stated Deputy Prime Minister Alexander
Vondra after the summit, which was an overall success for the Czech
Presidency.78
The Czech Republic was also planning an informal Energy Council,
gathering EU ministers and representatives of the supply countries, and
advocating the need to strengthen energy relations with the Caucasus and
Central Asia in order to enhance Europe’s negotiation clout with energy
suppliers. The meeting was scheduled for 8 May and was officially named
the Southern Corridor Summit. As the Summit was to be a highlight of the
Czech Presidency and required some political capital, it was part of the
Czech interinstitutional deal that it would take place just after the end of
Topolánek’s government-in-resignation term before a caretaker government
assumed office. 
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78 The package will be financed from the EU budget reserves. It has to be approved by the
European Parliament, which can modify its content. The European Council urged the
Presidency to embark on fast-track negotiations with the Parliament.
The external dimension of energy security is closely linked to the negotia-
tion of a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia, which
was renewed during the French Presidency in November 2008. The Czech
Presidency advocated including the Energy Charter (or a supplier code of
conduct) into the agreement. The EU–Russia summit scheduled for 21-22
May 2009 was envisaged as a potential field for discussions of the Charter.
With EU representation likely headed by Czech President Václav Klaus,
any expectations of a substantial shift dropped. 
The Third Energy Package (electricity and gas liberalisation)
The Czech Presidency reached a compromise on the final shape of energy
market liberalisation and finalised the Third Energy Package (inherited
agenda). A trialogue including the expert team of the Presidency and
European Parliament and Commission representatives was launched
in February 2009 and concluded with the compromise reached at the end
of March 2009, building on the generally accepted compromise in the
Council. On 31 March, the European Parliament’s ITRE committee formally
approved the final compromise. At the time of writing, the legislative
process was still not concluded, though the Czech Presidency has in a
sense successfully achieved one of its major priorities. The European
Parliament dropped the condition for the full ownership unbundling of pro-
ducers and distributors in the electricity sector; it accepted three options
(as in the gas sector),79 from which the Member States can choose, in
return for strengthened consumer protection and increased transparency of
market oversight. 
Preparation of the EU position for the Copenhagen Conference 
The participation of the Green Party in the Czech Government prompted
more environmentally friendly policies, and the post-Kyoto regime became
an important issue that was even promoted by the Government,80 although
the major coalition party’s (ODS) former chairman Václav Klaus is
perhaps the world’s best-known global warming denier, questioning any
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79 The Commission earlier proposed, as an alternative to complete unbundling, the establish-
ment of an Independent System Operator that would effectively run the transmission
networks, which could be owned by the producer, and a third option, proposed by France
and Germany, allowing part of the decision-making competences in the distribution field to
remain in the hands of energy producers (i.e. the owners of the transmission networks). 
80 The Czech Government’s main counter-argument concerned other major players/polluters,
stressing that unless China, India, the US and other major economies are on board, the
European pioneering effort is useless. Worse still, it could even be self-defeating because
European measures, if too ambitious and not followed by the rest of the world, could reduce
greenhouse gas emissions by only 1% of total world emissions, simultaneously lowering the
competitiveness of the European economy.
efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Due to the poor credibility
of the Czech Presidency in the field, arising from several factors,81 and
despite the fact that the Green Minister of the Environment Martin Bursík
played an active role in pre-negotiating the Copenhagen deal, the Czech
Presidency was keeping a low profile in the whole climate change agenda,
envisioning Sweden playing the major role. However, at the EU Environ-
ment Council on 2 March 2009, very detailed conclusions describing the
EU’s vision for the future agreement on Copenhagen Climate Summit
mandate were adopted, and the first draft of the position is expected to be
on the table during the Czech Presidency. During the informal summit of
environmental ministers held in Prague on 14–15 April, the mandate was
not finalised. To underline the consensus, the spring ECOFIN meeting
concurred with the environment ministers regarding two and a half pages
of conclusions. It was the first time that finance ministers had adopted
specific conclusions on climate change. 
At the March European Council, the strong mandate for further discus-
sions on the Copenhagen mandate was confirmed, and there was discus-
sion of how to support developing countries by helping them adapt to
climate change and develop green technologies (Minister of the Environ-
ment Martin Bursík’s priority). According to the Presidency, it was too early
to determine specific sums of money. The Presidency Conclusions stated:
‘Future discussions on generating financial support should focus on, inter
alia, different approaches, including a contributory approach based on an
agreed scale, market-based approaches based on auctioning arrangements
or a combination of these and other options.’82 It was agreed that the spe-
cifics of the international financing mechanism would be discussed during
the June European Council in order to determine the financing mechanism
well in advance of the Copenhagen Conference. With questions arising
regarding the summer summit, in view of the failure of the ODS-led
government, it is hard to estimate the agenda development at the time of
writing.   
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81 These include the President’s position and incoherent domestic positions in the past, caused
by internal clashes within the ODS-led government (e.g. the Green Party vs. ODS over
nuclear energy, ETS and renewable resources), within the public administration (e.g. the
Ministry of the Environment vs. the Ministry of Industry and Trade) and also among Czech
interest groups (e.g. energy companies and industrial sector unions vs. environmental
groups); the Government, however, managed to reach a compromise position on the 
ost-Kyoto proposals. Finally, the Czech Republic is also not a major proponent of reducing
greenhouse emissions. It has always been highly industrialised and produced considerable
emissions, relying on coal as a stable source of electricity and heat. The Czech Republic is
the biggest per capita EU polluter in general terms. 
82 Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, 7880/09, 20 March 2009, p. 11.
4.3 Europe in the World
4.3.1 Eastern Partnership and Relations with Russia
Relations between the EU and its Eastern neighbours, including Russia,
resonated strongly in the foreign policy priorities of the Czech Presidency
from the moment when the first strategic documents were being drafted.
These relations were moving up the priority list as the Presidency was
approaching, because the Vice-Prime Minister’s office realised that this
could be a real flagship for the Czech Presidency in external relations and
an area where the Czech Republic could clearly show its added value. 
Czech diplomatic activism vis-à-vis Eastern Europe started well before the
Presidency. Czech experts identify four junctures that were instrumental in
shaping Czech interest in the region: the Non-Paper of the Czech Ministry
of Foreign Affairs from 2007, the French Union for the Mediterranean pro-
posals, the Polish–Swedish initiative for the Eastern Partnership and finally
the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008.83
The first idea of enforcing the Eastern dimension of the European
Neighbourhood Policy came about during the Czech Presidency of the
Visegrad group in 2007–2008. The aim was to mobilise the support of the
Visegrad partners for the upcoming Czech EU Presidency. The Czech
Non-Paper was aiming to develop the multilateral dimension of the Eastern
part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), in addition to the
current largely bilateral approach pursued by the European Commission
(through individual action plans negotiated and signed with the countries
included), which would be project based and enhance the regional
approach. Although the document had formerly served as a basis for
discussions among the Visegrad countries, Czech diplomacy engaged in
consulting other key partners deemed important actors, to ensure wide
support for the initiative, particularly from Germany, Sweden and the three
Baltic countries. As a result, the Non-Paper essentially paved the way for
the subsequent Polish–Swedish initiative, when a more detailed proposal
building on the previous Czech initiative was tabled before the Council
and finally approved at the June 2008 European Council meeting. 
The instrumental incentive for the Czech initiative to shape the
Eastern Partnership was the strong French push to develop the southern
(Mediterranean) dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The
French proposal, already accepted at the EU level in March 2008 and
launched officially at the Euro–Mediterranean summit in July 2008, gave a
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83 Tulmets, E., ‘Preparing the EU Presidency: the Czech Contribution to the Project of Eastern
Partnership’. Polish Quarterly of International Relations (2009).
clear incentive to the Czech Presidency to start working, formally and
informally, on the eastern dimension of the ENP, as the conclusions of the
December 2007 European Council mandated the Commission and the
Member States to develop both the eastern and southern dimensions of the
ENP.84 Moreover, the Czechs were very careful not to attempt to undermine
the community nature of the Eastern Partnership. This was in contrast to
the original French proposal for the Mediterranean Union, in which case it
was not clear what the relationship with current community policies (e.g.
the Barcelona Process and the ENP) would be. As well, Sarkozy had
originally proposed including only EU Mediterranean littoral countries,
which alienated many Member States, notably Germany. All the Czech
Government’s strategic documents conceive of the Eastern Partnership
remaining firmly part of the ENP, focusing on six eastern neighbours
(i.e. Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) and
developing the Partnership’s multilateral dimension. 
The incoming Czech Presidency has thus, along with Sweden and Poland,
contributed to the Commission’s communication on the Eastern Partner-
ship, published in December 2008.85 Looking at the contents of the
communication, many of its elements actually overlap the general Czech
priorities for the EU. For example, the approach leading to gradual integra-
tion of the Eastern neighbours into the European economy, through deep
and comprehensive free trade agreements, is aligned with the Czech idea
of a liberal, economically open Europe. Another policy explicitly mentioned
in the communication is energy security, which certainly has become a top
priority of the Czech Presidency, as the Czechs recognise the key strategic
importance of Ukraine and Caucasus as the key energy corridors for Europe.
Another important element of the communication is the facilitation of
people-to-people contacts between the Eastern neighbours and the EU. It is
recognised that a long-term goal should be the establishment of visa-free
regimes with all the countries involved, following on the visa facilitation
agreements some of the countries have already reached.86 Again, this goes
along with the Czech idea of Europe without barriers, including, by exten-
sion, barriers between the EU and neighbouring countries, as opposed to
the idea of ‘Fortress Europe’. 
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84 European Council, Conclusions, 14 December 2007.
85 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council: Eastern Partnership, SEC(2008) 2974 (Brussels, 3 December 2008).
86 For example, Ukraine, Moldova and Russia (although Russia is not included in either the
ENP or the Eastern Partnership) have such agreements with the EU. The Ukrainian and
Moldovan agreements have been in force since January 2008, the Russian agreement since
July 2007.
There are still, however, many question marks concerning the initiatives
the Czech Presidency has to tackle before the inaugural summit in Prague
on 7 May 2009. The first task, already accomplished, was to persuade those
Member States that were not overly enthusiastic about strengthening the
eastern dimension of the ENP to endorse the project as such. In this
respect, the Czech Presidency, in negotiation with the other EU partners,
especially highlighted the following factors: the Eastern Partnership is not
anti-Russian; it does not aim at a fundamental reallocation of funds between
the East and the South (in favour of the East); it does not oppose other
policies and does not (at least for the time being) give the countries
concerned an accession perspective. Direct opposition was expected,
especially from those countries favouring the southern dimension. How-
ever, after the Union for the Mediterranean project was endorsed by the
Council, it was easier to reduce such opposition. This was largely achieved
at the European Council on 19–20 March 2009, which in its conclusions
endorses the Eastern Partnership as a concept, endorses the first summit of
the Eastern Partnership to be held on 7 May 2009 and contains a declara-
tion specifying the nature of the overall framework, including EU financial
commitments of EUR 600 million up to 2013, the relationship to the Black
Sea Synergy initiative, the main areas of cooperation (i.e. democracy and
good governance, economic integration, energy security and people-to-
people contacts) as well as regular biannual meetings of heads of govern-
ments of participating countries and annual meetings at the foreign minister
levels.87
However, it seems that the concept (based on the aforementioned commu-
nication) still lacks substance, in terms of concrete deliverables and tools
that would go beyond the framework of current ENP instruments, and
lacks concrete examples of how multilateral cooperation will be achieved
and managed. This is rather a long-term task for the next Commission,
which can hardly be tackled by the Presidency, although it can provide
some ideas and guidance. An equally challenging task is persuading the
partner countries to sign onto the project and give them the sense of
co-ownership of the initiative, which is already reflected in its name –
‘Partnership’. Clearly, the EU cannot use the same ‘carrot and stick’ strategy
it used in the case of EU enlargement, and simply put on the table things
the European countries are interested in, without consulting the target
countries. For this reason, the Czech Presidency has initiated two rounds
of multilateral negotiations with the six target countries at the supreme
director and deputy minister levels, in February and April 2009, respectively,
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to explain the background of the whole initiative and clarify ideas and
intentions ahead of the first formal summit in May. 
Some doubts and criticism have also been raised about the format of the
initiative and the six countries it should cover, which led to a certain
tension between the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, particularly in relation to Belarus. While the Czech Government as
a whole is determined to make the Eastern Partnership summit a success
and a ‘showcase’ achievement of the Czech Presidency, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs is more concerned that inviting President Lukashenko to
the summit might undermine the credibility of Czech foreign policy, which
is renowned in the EU for being value-driven and emphasising democracy
and human rights.88 This approach is also shared by many democracy and
human rights NGOs, which have tabled a petition opposing the invitation
of Lukashenko to the summit. Thus the question emerges again whether
the six countries should be put in ‘one basket’ and whether the EU should
engage with all of them in the same way, regardless of their internal condi-
tions and progress towards meeting EU standards, including democracy
and human rights. 
In relation to the Eastern Partnership, one must certainly mention EU–
Russia relations. The Czech Republic has striven for a balanced position
between the ‘Russo hawks’, such as Poland or Lithuania and ‘Russo doves’,
such as Germany, Italy or France. The Czech Government acknowledges
the necessity of pragmatic cooperation in different areas, such as energy,
climate change, security and migration management. At the same time, it
is very cautious about Russian intentions in the EU neighbourhood, especi-
ally after the Russian– Georgian war in August 2008. The Russian aggres-
sion against Georgian territory earned very harsh condemnation of the
Czech Prime Minister, and it was Mirek Topolánek who first called for a
donors’ conference to help reconstruct Georgia and offered to host it.
Czech policy makers also generally recognise the reality of EU–Russia
relations, where, in the absence of a single European voice, Russian
leaders tend to deal individually with EU Member States. For this reason,
the Czech Presidency intended to take a lower profile vis-à-vis Russia
during its term. The Czech Government holds that, as it is so difficult to
articulate a common European position on Russia, more attention must be
devoted to analysing and understanding Russia’s motives underpinning its
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88 Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg finally tackled the issue quite diplomatically, not issuing
the summit invitation to Lukashenko personally but to Belarus as a country. Through
diplomatic channels, it was indicated to Lukashenko that he would not be received by
President Klaus.
policies towards the EU. Only once such analysis is shared at the EU level,
can a long-term strategy towards Russia can be developed. The Czech
Presidency is very supportive of developing such dialogue on Russia, not
only at the political or official levels, but also among experts, academics
and think-tank members across the EU. However, no concrete measures or
platform structures were proposed during the Presidency. 
The Czech Presidency was confronted with some pressing questions
regarding EU–Russia relations. The first, rather unexpected issue was the
need to negotiate with Prime Minister Putin during the January gas dispute
(see section 5.2). Another important point was the negotiation of the stra-
tegic partnership agreement, a document to replace the outdated Partner-
ship and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). However, the Presidency’s leverage
is limited, as such negotiations are pursued by the Commission and the
resumption of talks after the Russian–Georgian conflict had already been
achieved under the French Presidency, but at a cost of very legalistic inter-
pretation of the European Council conclusions of 2 September 2008.89 The
Russian attitude towards the Eastern Partnership is also worth examining.
Some Czech officials believe that the gas dispute between Russia and
Ukraine was intentionally escalated by Russia to undermine the credibility
of Ukraine as a transit country, and to undermine the whole emerging
‘Eastern Partnership’ concept, which Moscow views as an anti-Russian
initiative. Similarly, Czech officials interpret Russia’s desire to be invited
as an observer to the Eastern Partnership Summit on 7 May as an attempt
to protect its interest since this summit takes place simultaneously to the
Southern Corridor Summit which brings together Caspian region suppliers,
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, and the transit countries. Both
summits are seen by Russia as part of a deliberate attempt to exclude the
country from potential talks on alternate energy routes to Europe.90
Finally, the April 2009 developments in Moldova, following the outcome
of the parliamentary elections won by the Communists but disputed by
the opposition, clearly called for political involvement from the Czech
Presidency. The lack of a strong reaction to the crisis could potentially
undermine the Eastern Partnership. Unfortunately, the crisis in Moldova
happened just around the Easter holidays, with EU High Representative
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90 Russian participation in the summit has not been confirmed; this information is based only
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Javier Solana not wanting to become involved and, moreover, with the
Prague Government already in resignation, it was not in a particularly
good position to mediate a political solution. Presidency action was thus
limited to issuing a statement calling for an end to hostilities91 and respect
for the rule of law, and to including the Moldovan situation on the agenda
of GAERC to be convened on 27 April in Luxembourg. The lack of Czech
activism arguably raised some doubt as to how serious the Czech Presiden-
cy is about the Eastern Partnership, particularly in Russian eyes. According
to Deputy Prime Minister Vondra, the developments in Moldova justify the
Eastern Partnership concept as a way of anchoring these countries more
firmly in the West.   
4.3.2 The Western Balkans and EU enlargement
Support for the continuation of the enlargement process has been among
the top foreign policy priorities of the Czech EU Presidency from the very
first moment. The Czech Government planned to focus on the Western
Balkans and their integration into the EU. The main emphasis was on
the accession talks with Croatia, implementation of the Stabilisation and
Association Agreements (SAA) with the Western Balkan countries, Kosovo,
and visa liberalisation process. The Presidency also wanted to open two
new negotiation chapters with Turkey. 
However, factors such as the economic crisis and Lisbon Treaty ratification
problems left the Czech Republic with very little leverage over possible
progress in this area. Some of the old EU Member States, especially
France, the Netherlands and Germany, were doing all they could to halt the
enlargement process until the Lisbon Treaty is ratified and the new institu-
tional framework established. Similarly, the economic crisis is exhausting
the Member States, leaving them no energy with which to focus on other
issues. This further increases the ‘enlargement fatigue’, observable in the
EU after the 2004 and particularly after the 2007 enlargements. On the
other hand, the accession of Croatia and Albania to NATO could send a
positive signal to the Western Balkan region, as NATO membership is
sometimes considered a ‘waiting room’ for EU membership.
The Gymnich92 meeting at Hluboká nad Vltavou château on 28 March
2009, which, besides other matters, was also dedicated to enlargement
(with a special focus on the Western Balkan countries, thus setting aside
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Turkey), brought nothing new but the usual mandatory reiteration that EU
doors are still open to the Western Balkans. The conclusions of the meet-
ing, also attended by the ministers of foreign affairs of candidate countries
(i.e. Croatia, Turkey and Macedonia) and potential candidate countries
(the remaining Western Balkan countries, i.e. Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Albania), however, clearly articulated EU
determination to progress towards visa liberalisation in 2009,93 to help
the countries to tackle the effects of the economic crisis and to support
Kosovo’s full integration into regional cooperation bodies.94
Croatia
The Presidency has so far achieved little in concrete terms. The negotia-
tions (meaning opening new chapters and closing old ones) have been
blocked by Slovenia since December 2008. Slovenia is using its leverage in
the negotiation process to solve the unsettled issue of the common border.
The Czech Government has supported Enlargement Commissioner Olli
Rehn who intends to facilitate the settlement of this issue. Croatia has
wanted to bring the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the
Hague, while Slovenia is pushing the EU to assume the arbitration role in
the conflict and rejects ICJ jurisdiction. A compromise proposed by Olli
Rehn, to create an expert group led by former Finnish president Martti
Ahtisaari, which would propose a solution, might be acceptable to both
parties. The Czech Presidency, together with France and Sweden, support
this initiative. However, it is expected that the accession talks will not
progress further in the remainder of the Czech EU Presidency, even if
Slovenia95 immediately unblocks the negotiations. It is therefore unrealistic
to expect the conclusion of negotiations according to original plan, i.e. by
the end of the Swedish Presidency.
Montenegro
The Czech Presidency has so far been unable to fulfil another priority in
the Balkan area, namely, processing Montenegro’s membership applica-
tion,96 which is currently blocked by the Netherlands, Germany, Spain and
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Belgium.97 However, anonymous diplomatic sources cite the fact that, espe-
cially after the Gymnich meeting in Hluboká, the opinions of Member Sta-
tes are converging and Montenegro’s application could be processed during
the Czech Presidency. 
Albania
Major problems are expected with the application of Albania, which,
according to the latest information,98 may be tabled on 28 April. Albania
ranks – along with Turkey – as a country with the lowest public support
among the EU citizens for joining the EU. With European Parliament elec-
tions and the German general elections approaching fast, Albania cannot
expect positive reactions from the Member States. However, it looks as
though Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha is counting on the positive
Czech attitude and on the Swedish Presidency, and does not want to miss
the concurrence of two consecutive enlargement-friendly presidencies to
deposit the country’s formal application for membership.
Macedonia
Although the Czech EU Presidency also wanted to mediate a resolution of
the name row between Macedonia and Greece, so far nothing has
happened. Macedonia has been waiting for the results of presidential and
local elections, and the dispute resolution is being negotiated primarily
under UN auspices. A decision on the start date of the accession negotia-
tions cannot be expected during the Czech Presidency and will most likely
be only be made on the basis the progress report prepared by the European
Commission in autumn 2009 during the Swedish Presidency.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
In the case of Bosnia, the Czech Presidency is focusing on increasing
Bosnian ‘ownership’ of the Office of High Representative (OHR) and
strengthening the EU Special Representative (EUSR), which is, however,
conditional on achieving the objectives and conditions established by the
Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in 2008.99 Some objectives, such as
the status of Brcko and division of state property, remain to be resolved, so
OHR could not be closed as of the March meeting of the PIC Steering
Committee. The EU had to deal with the resignation of Miroslav Lajcak
from the post of the High Representative in January 2009 and, together
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with the European Commission and other Member States100 that are
members of the PIC Steering Committee, manage the appointment of
Austrian diplomat Valentin Inzko to this function.
Serbia
Efforts of the Czech EU Presidency and other Member States to unfreeze
the ratification of the Stabilization and Association Agreement and allow
implementation of the Interim Trade Agreement with Serbia are being
blocked by the Netherlands, which requires that Serbia fully cooperate
with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
The Dutch believe this means delivering Ratko Mladi_ – indicted for
genocide and other war crimes – to the Tribunal. It seems that no progress
can be achieved in this without meeting this condition of the Netherlands.
Regardless of this fact, there is still a rather limited chance that Serbia will
submit an application for EU membership during the Czech Presidency.
Kosovo
Given that EU Member States cannot agree on a common position on the
status of Kosovo, the Czech Presidency has a limited possibility of achiev-
ing further progress in this area. The Presidency is focusing on Kosovo’s
inclusion in the EU integration processes (Kosovo’s Minister of Foreign
Affairs Skender Hyseni has been invited to the Gymnich meeting), especi-
ally into the Stabilization and Association Process. The Presidency has also
supported the European Commission in deploying the EULEX mission in
Kosovo.
Visa liberalisation
No significant progress has been made with respect to visa liberalisation,
and the Presidency is awaiting the results of the assessment missions sent
to the Western Balkan countries between January and March of 2009.
Upon receiving their reports, expected to be published by the European
Commission in May 2009, the process of lifting the visa requirement
for the Western Balkan countries could still start during the Czech term.
This scenario is supported by a group of eight Member States,101 led by
Hungary, that issued a statement backing the Czech Presidency in its inten-
tions to speed up the whole process. At least Macedonia is expected to
fulfil all the necessary technical criteria, and Serbia and Montenegro
59
100 France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.
101 Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia;
http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/en/bal/actualities/spokesman_statements/Western+
Balkans_visa_090404.htm.
might also be recommended. However, in the case of Serbia, there is the
unresolved problem of issuing Serbian passports to Kosovo citizens (both
Albanians and Serbs) as well as to Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The former is perceived by some of the Member States as a security risk
and the latter would leave mainly the Muslim community in Bosnia and
Herzegovina affected by the visa regime (similarly, Croatia has been
providing Croats from BiH with dual citizenship).
Turkey
Although further progress in the accession negotiations with Turkey has
not been among the top priorities of the Czech EU Presidency, it did plan
to open at least two new negotiating chapters, concerning taxation and
employment. These chapters are ‘non-problematic’ for Cyprus as they do
not concern the disputed issue of the customs union between the EU and
Turkey. However, their opening is conditional on adopting new legislation,
which Turkey has so far failed to do. The Czech EU Presidency is trying to
facilitate the resolution of the conflict between Turkey and Cyprus and has
been holding negotiations with both governments, but with no significant
results so far. The Czech Presidency, however, needs to have Turkey
on board for the Southern Corridor initiative, which is proving difficult
given that the energy negotiations are frozen. Turkey requires that the EU
re-open the negotiations in the chapter being opposed by Cyprus. On 21
April 2009, a ministerial-level Troika meeting with Turkey is planned in
Prague, but again no concrete results are expected.
4.3.3 Transatlantic Relations 
With the centre–right government in power, transatlantic relations were
considered another crucial priority for the Czech Presidency’s foreign policy
agenda. Generally, the Czech Republic belongs to the ‘Atlanticist’ camp in
the EU and believes strongly in the value of a close relationship with the
United States in an increasingly polarised world. The US election in
autumn of 2008 that brought Barrack Obama to power thus opened a
window of opportunity for the Czech Presidency to give a fresh boost to
transatlantic relations. 
However, relations with the new Democratic administration are not
uncontested. In bilateral relations, there was considerable nervousness,
particularly in ODS, regarding the new administration’s approach to locat-
ing the missile defence system in Central Europe. While the Czech Prime
Minister made ratifying the Missile Defence Treaty, signed by his govern-
ment in July 2008, a priority, President Obama signalled that he might not
push for its fast implementation (some analysts even suspect he might
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withdraw from it altogether), and argued that the matter required broad
consultation with Russia. Another issue on which Prague and Washington
might not have the same views is global climate change. Although the
Government finally took the issue more seriously and incorporated it into
its priorities, the sceptical attitude of Václav Klaus has left some tensions
with the new US administration, which will come to the fore particularly if
Klaus is in charge of the EU–US Troika summit in Washington in June
2009. Similarly, the Czech Republic welcomed one of Barrack Obama’s
first decisions after taking the office, the decision to close the Guantanamo
Bay facility. At the same time, Interior Minister Ivan Langer signalled that
the Czech Republic is not considering accepting any of the prisoners
detained at the Guantanamo Bay base, reiterated on other occasions by
both Prime Minister Topolánek and Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg.102
Finally, Topolánek referred to the US economic rescue package in his
speech in the European Parliament on 25 March 2009 as a ‘road to hell’.
This statement, pronounced shortly ahead of the EU–US summit in
Prague, received wide coverage in the international media, including on
CNN.103
Prime Minister Topolánek succeeded in convincing President Obama to
hold an informal EU–US summit in Prague on 5 April, following the G20
summit in London and the NATO summit in Strasbourg and Kehl, marking
the sixtieth anniversary of the alliance’s foundation. There was some
squabbling with the Council Secretariat and some of the Member States
about whether to hold the summit in Prague or Brussels. Having the
summit hosted in Prague was an important diplomatic victory for the
Czech Presidency, although some commentators admit that it was actually
the request of former President Václav Havel that convinced the White
House to agree. In any case, the summit was important symbolically rather
than substantively. First, it was very short, amounting to a mere courtesy
luncheon meeting summoning the heads of government 27 Member States
to meet with the US President. Second, it largely involved President
Obama informing EU leaders of the priorities of his administration, in
which he emphasised the necessity of joint action against global climate
change, of fighting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and of the inten-
tion to engage in dialogue with Russia on limiting nuclear arsenals and
with Iran on its nuclear programme. Barrack Obama also appealed to the
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EU countries to accept some of the Guantanamo detainees and to increase
the European commitment in Afghanistan. Another strong message was
explicit support for the membership of Turkey in the EU, which was
reiterated by the fact that the last stop on his European trip was Ankara. 
Under the Czech Presidency, another EU–US summit is expected in
the Troika format (i.e. Presidency, Commission and High Representative
Solana) at the end of June 2009. There were some doubts as to whether the
summit would take place at all, because there were signals from the US
administration that they might want to postpone it until the new Commis-
sion was in office,104 though this would not be until late 2009. Another
argument for postponing the summit was that the informal meeting with
the 27 EU heads of state has already taken place in Prague. Nevertheless,
the US administration finally agreed to have another summit as previously
scheduled. Doubts were exacerbated with the fall of the Government in
Prague, leading to a caretaker bureaucratic government without enough
political clout to negotiate some of the controversial issues with the United
States, such as the approach to the Copenhagen Conference on global
climate change or further action on the economic crisis in the G20 format.
The Commission will therefore likely assume a more active role at the
summit. There is also the risk that Klaus might be representing the Czech
Presidency, which could lead to mixed results at best regarding both crucial
issues that will probably top the agenda.
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5 EXECUTION OF THE PRESIDENCY
5.1 The Gaza Crisis
The start of the Czech EU Presidency was harsh and bumpy, mainly due to
the two crises emerging just before or right after its launch – one linked to
the Israeli attack against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the other to interrupted
gas supplies to some European countries due to the gas dispute between
Russia and Ukraine. 
The escalation of violence in Gaza put the Czech Government and
diplomacy in a particularly precarious position. The Middle East represents
one of the most sensitive regions in the world, and addressing the situation
there requires balancing between many actors in the region, and between
EU Member States that might be inclined to side either with Israel or the
Palestinian Authority and its supporters. Czech diplomacy has actually
articulated the improvement of Israel–EU relations as an external relations
priority, albeit a subsidiary one. The idea was to win more credibility in
Israel for the EU at a time when the United States, traditionally Israel’s
main ally and supporter, was in transition to the new administration.
Similar interest was also articulated on the part of Israel, particularly by
the business community. The sign of this new upgraded relationship was to
be the first ever EU–Israel summit and negotiation of an upgraded European
Neighbourhood Policy action plan, after the expiry of the current one in
the spring of 2009. 
Although Czech diplomacy has tried to take a balanced approach towards
the Middle East and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, recognising the
legitimate right of Israel to strike against terrorist organisations as well as
the right of Palestinians to their own state, politically, the ODS-led govern-
ment that emerged from the 2006 elections was generally rather pro-Israel.
This was evidenced by many statements of the Prime Minister or other
senior government figures.105 Similarly, Israel views the Czech Republic as
one of its biggest supporters inside the EU.106 This somewhat complicated
the desire of the Czech Presidency to assume the role of impartial mediator
after the outbreak of the crisis. 
The first faux pas concerning the Czech handling of the crisis came very
early in the conflict, on 2 January 2009, when the Prime Minister’s spokes-
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man Jirˇí Frantisˇek Potuzˇník referred to the Israeli action as the ‘legitimate
act of self-defence’. After an outburst of criticism from the foreign mini-
stries of some EU Member States and from the Czech opposition, Potuzˇník
apologised and offered his resignation. The situation had to be remedied by
Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg, who admitted that such a statement
was a mistake. Nevertheless, Schwarzenberg stated quite clearly that,
although the proportionality of Israel’s response was disputable, the main
blame for the outburst of violence lay with Hamas.107
The ambitions of the Czech Presidency related to the settlement of
the crisis were thus fairly limited, which was explicitly admitted by
Schwarzenberg himself in an interview with the Czech daily Hospodarske
noviny.108 Similarly, the Head of the Czech Permanent Representation to the
UN Martin Palousˇ admitted: ‘Nobody expects us to act as big, robust
players. Our approach should be a cooperative one. Coordination, media-
tion of information, without exaggerated ambitions to change the world’.109
The principal aim was to ensure that humanitarian aid could reach Gaza,
which was already agreed to at the extraordinary meeting of GAERC in
Paris on 30 December 2008. Even Schwarzenberg, who led the EU
mission to the Middle East on 5 January 2008, admitted that the proposals
for immediate ceasefire came too early and were thus refused by Israel. 
One matter that did not pass unnoticed by the Czech and the international
press was Nicolas Sarkozy’s ‘parallel’ mission to the Middle East. Apart
from the EU delegation,110 which visited Israel, the Palestinian Authority,
Egypt and Jordan, Sarkozy visited Syria as well. Although the joint Franco–
Egyptian initiative for immediate ceasefire and opening up corridors to
Gaza was not accepted immediately, it did lead to Egypt assuming the key
role in negotiating the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel. The EU was
virtually excluded from this process, its role limited to issuing statements
on the current Middle East situation, but not becoming a substantive player
of mediating the conflict. EU leverage, particularly over Israel, was further
reduced with the outcome of the Israeli parliamentary elections, which
brought to power the Likud coalition and the far-right Israel Our Home
party. This has shifted the Israeli policy towards Hamas to an even more
hard-line approach. 
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Evaluating the performance of the Czech Presidency regarding the Gaza
crisis is not easy. The performance was definitely not spectacular, but the
question remains whether the EU as such had the necessary tools and
incentives at its disposal to do anything more to bring about a quick cease-
fire and play a more active mediating role. Furthermore, the extent to
which the escalation of violence in Gaza strained EU–Israel relations
remains to be seen. In any case, the original Czech plans for upgrading
relations with Israel and organising the first ever EU–Israel summit are
very much off the table three months ahead of the Czech EU Presidency.
This is primarily because of the negative reactions on the part of EU
Member States after Gaza. In addition, the organisation of the summit
was based on the assumption that the moderate centrist Kadima party of
former Foreign Minister Tsipi Livni (with whom the issue had been pre-
negotiated) would form the government; the new Israeli government would
probably not even be interested in such an initiative.  
5.2 The Gas Crisis
Another crisis that struck the Czech Presidency right at its beginning and
helped make the first weeks of the Czech term solely an exercise in crisis
management was the dispute between Russia and Ukraine over gas. The
Czech Government was already following the row closely before the start
of the Presidency. Towards the end of 2008 it was becoming clear that
negotiations between Gazprom and Naftogaz on the new gas supply agree-
ment, as well as disagreement on the alleged Ukrainian debt to Gazprom
amounting to USD 600 million (according to Gazprom), could lead to the
interruption of supplies to Ukraine and jeopardise gas transit to the EU.
The supplies to Ukraine were actually stopped on 1 January 2009. In fact,
the Czech Republic’s first declaration in its capacity of EU President, issued
on 1 January, expressed concerns that the Gazprom and Naftogaz disputes
were not settled, and stated that the Presidency and the European Commis-
sion believed that the gas supply commitments to European countries
would be met.111 The Prime Minister confirmed that, at this stage, he was
already in contact with both the Ukrainian and Russian parties, and with
representatives of other Member States, and that he was assured that the
interruption of supplies to European customers was not imminent.
It must be underlined that the Presidency did not want to get directly
involved in the dispute at its inception. It was officially regarded as a
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bilateral commercial dispute between Gazprom and Naftogaz,112 although
Czech politicians were well aware of the wider political repercussions of
the crisis for relations between the two countries and between them and the
EU. Alexandr Vondra, in a briefing after meeting with Gazprom represen-
tatives in Prague on 3 January 2009, explained the Presidency’s standpoint:
‘We refuse to be party or arbiters to the dispute, which we consider to be
of a commercial nature. We don’t know the contents of all the contracts
and both parties consider them to be confidential’.113
Nevertheless, as early as 4 January, a significantly lower flow of gas was
recorded into some EU Member States, including Poland, Romania and
Hungary, which in a few days resulted in the compete cut-off of some
countries that rely solely on Russian gas transported via Ukraine, such as
Slovakia and Bulgaria. The Presidency reacted immediately, issuing a
declaration calling for full resumption of supplies to the EU and fast settle-
ment of dispute between the Russian Gazprom and Ukrainian Naftogaz.114
Simultaneously, the Czech Presidency launched a substantial diplomatic
offensive, along with the European Commission, negotiating with the
Ukrainian Government, Naftogaz and Gazprom’s representative office in
Berlin. The Presidency also summoned an extraordinary General Affairs
Council meeting on 8 January and proclaimed its determination to organise
a meeting with Ukrainian and Russian political representation, should the
dispute not be settled.115 The conclusions of the GAERC meeting tried to
put pressure on both parties to accept an independent EU monitoring
mission, which would supervise the gas flow in the pipelines, particularly
on the Russian–Ukrainian and the Ukrainian–EU borders. The Council also
agreed on the necessity of addressing the wider repercussions of the
current crisis in the long term, such as transparency of supplies and adopt-
ing a crisis mechanism based on internationally recognised principles that
would avert such situations, particularly in the winter.116
The main task of the Presidency was now to convince both parties, i.e.
Russia and Ukraine, to agree to the EU monitoring mission, which would
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be the main precondition for a full renewal of Russian gas transit via
Ukraine. The joint plan of the Czech Presidency and European Commis-
sion was presented by Prime Minister Topolánek in Ukraine on 9 January
and to Vladimir Putin in Moscow on 10 January 2009. After several hours
of negotiations, both parties agreed on the conditions under which the
monitoring mission would operate and signed the agreement, paving the
way for the immediate restoration of supplies. Topolánek brought the
agreement back to Kiev to be signed by the Ukrainian Government. The
agreement was accepted by Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko
the next day (11 January). On the same day, however, the validity of the
agreement was disputed by the Russian President Medvedev, who claimed
that Ukrainian representation had attached new clauses to the agreement
that were not part of the original text. The agreement was re-signed the
next day, on 12 January, in Brussels by all parties concerned and the gas
supplies were supposed to be resumed on 13 January.
However, it took almost another week before the gas started to flow to
Europe again. The two parties again started to squabble: while Russia was
accusing Ukraine of ‘stealing’ the gas, Ukraine cited technical problems
caused by low pressure in the pipelines, which meant it would need more
technical gas from Russia, or to use its own contingency reserves, which
Naftogaz refused to do.117 Russian President Medvedev was advocating
a need to summon another summit of recipient countries, Russia and
Ukraine in Moscow. Although Ukraine essentially agreed with this,
President Yushchenko was in favour of having the summit either in
Brussels or Prague,118 which would be more ‘neutral’. This clearly indicates
that the dispute was becoming highly politicised. Prime Minister Topolánek
also favoured hosting the meeting on the EU soil; however, President
Medvedev started organising the summit in Moscow on 17 January. The
negotiations were extremely complicated and long, and included conditions
for supplying technical gas to Ukraine, the price of gas for Ukrainian
customers and transit fees. Agreement was finally reached but, strangely,
the official message that Prime Ministers Putin and Tymoshenko conveyed
after the end of negotiations was that they had agreed on the future price
Ukraine would pay for Russian gas, not mentioning the technical gas nor
the alleged USD 600 million debt claimed by Russia. 
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The Czech Presidency has drawn several lessons from the crisis. Probably
the most important was that the EU can very easily be held hostage by
disputes between third parties over strategic energy supplies, and that it
lacks efficient leverage to exert pressure on them. In a way, this has helped
the Presidency advocate one of its main aims: devising and pushing
for alternate gas corridors to Europe (such as Nabucco) and for energy
diversification generally, to reduce Europe’s dependence on unstable and
unreliable suppliers or transit countries (in the Czech case, this means
opening further debate on nuclear energy). The Presidency was undoubtedly
aware of the political dimensions of the whole problem. A positive sign
was that the Czech Government acted as an impartial mediator and did not
take sides. Internally, however, some officials admitted that the whole case
was viewed inside the administration as a political game on part of Russia
to undermine Ukraine’s credibility in the EU and perhaps even to under-
mine the emerging Eastern Partnership.
The Czechs proved to be quite successful mediators, although their
involvement was substantially weaker after the deal on EU expert monitor-
ing was signed. The high diplomatic activity of the Prime Minister paid
off, as many feared that he might not be taken seriously, particularly by
Russian representatives, also due to the bilateral controversy over the pro-
posed US radar installations in the Czech Republic.119 This success could
also have been bolstered by a strong alignment with the Commission and
certain EU leaders, particularly Angela Merkel, on the whole issue. The
Czech performance in the gas crisis was also an exception in that it was
reported rather positively by the foreign press, including the German and
French press.12+
5.3 The Czech Presidency:
Crisis Management or Management Crisis?
The Czech Presidency’s ability to carry out the day-to-day business of the
Council was expected to be limited by several factors. As a rather small
Member State holding the Presidency for the first time, it was assumed
the Czechs would lack experienced personnel equipped with sufficient
language and analytical skills to carry out the Presidency tasks, and provide
background analysis and in-time service for demanding negotiations. Its
generally less efficient public administration, compared with those of the
old Member States, and strong inclination towards centralised decision-
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http://vyhledavani.ihned.cz/109-32647600-on-p%F8edsednictv%ED-M00000_d-02.
120 Ibid.
making at the national level, emphasised by the management model chosen
for Presidency operations, were thought likely to slow down Council
processes. Together with unfavourable external factors (e.g. EP elections
and the end of the European Commission’s term), the lack of European
political leadership experience on the part of Czech political elites and
their lack of interest in EU issues were expected to minimise the ability to
initiate new projects. 
To explore the performance of the Czech Presidency’s management of day-
to-day operations, short questionnaires were sent to the representatives
of the EU Council, European Commission and Permanent Representations
of EU Member States to the EU. Unfortunately, the response rate was so
low that it was impossible to draw substantiated conclusions based on a
sufficient number of responses.121 Some observations are, however, interest-
ing as they suggest avenues for possible further research. Generally, the
evaluations differ considerably depending on the respondent’s country of
origin, the representatives of new Member States generally rating the
Czech Presidency performance higher evaluation,122 of the Czech presidency,
either being more indulgent or not having enough experience to make
proper comparisons. This variable, however, needs to be dealt with and
seen in the context of the dossier for which each respondent is responsible,
the activity level of the Presidency in a given area, and conflict potential
with the agenda/dossier.  
To evaluate the findings, some Czech insiders were also asked to rate the
Presidency’s perceived performance. As seen and commented on from the
Czech Republic, the role of the Czech Permanent Representation was
emphasised and the quality of its work usually rated highly. As well, the
ability to arrange successful interinstitutional negotiations, especially
trialogues with the European Parliament on certain dossiers, was under-
lined. On the other hand, lack of analytical capacity and diplomatic resources
was perceived, especially in the Office of the Government. In the area
of external relations (the ‘Europe in the World’ priority), power shifted
back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Presidency and some
rivalries remained between the Office of the Government and the Minister
of Foreign Affairs. 
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121 Of approximately 300 potential respondents, only 12 returned the questionnaires.
The deadline for delivery was before the fall of the Czech Government.
122 Including respondents employed in EU institutions such as the European Commission and
Council Secretariat.
Seen from the Brussels perspective, the Czech Republic’s ability to carry
out the Presidency’s administrative functions was a little above average.
The quality of coordination, scheduling and chairing of the meetings at the
working level was evaluated differently in relation to the dossiers. A
general observation was that the chairpersons of the working groups were
usually also tasked with the organisation and secretarial management of
the work (distributing agendas, for example), which often resulted in
delays due to their frequent presence in meetings and the lack of informed
supporting staff; in other words, secretarial tasks were poorly delegated. As
well, in the Permanent Representation, the designated contact persons for
administrative issues related to meetings were often missing. Rather small
teams were usually responsible for each dossier, which was foreseeable;
however, according to some, the communication within some of the teams
was slow. The general ability of the Permanent Representation to coordinate
its performance was evaluated as well above average, and in some cases
was explicitly mentioned as superior to that of its imminent predecessor.
However, the most problematic element observed was a lack of decision-
making competence. Most of the compromises drafted had to be sent to
the capital for explicit approval by a minister or deputy minister, which
delayed consequent procedures in the Council. The ability to coordinate
interinstitutional negotiations was rated well above average, while the rated
level of procedural knowledge and cooperation with the Council Secretariat
varied in relation to the dossier, as did the rated language ability (some
respondents were rather critical on this count). The variable that scored
the worst was the ability to conduct informal consultations and bilateral
meetings; in this regard, the Czechs were criticised for lacking a proactive
stance and for having a limited number of bilateral contacts.
As for the agenda-setting function, the rating was below average. There
was some criticism of hasty and poorly-communicated agenda reshufflings
(one relevant tool of a Presidency in reaching its goals), but the main
problem seems to lie in the ability to start new projects or initiatives.
Despite the limited manoeuvring room allowed by the winding down of the
European Parliament and Commission mandates, the Czech Presidency
was perceived as un-innovative, tending to choose non-conflicting issues
(again, the rating depended largely on the respondent’s dossier).123
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123 With the fall of the Government, the Czech Presidency will most likely prove to be a lame
duck, even in the areas where it tried to develop new initiatives.
As for the function of honest broker, the Czech Presidency’s ability to
mediate compromise was generally rated well above average. The Czechs
were commended for their willingness to listen and for their effort to
prevent the big Member States from dominating the smaller ones. The
Presidency generally scored well in terms of credibility, fairness and
neutrality at the working level, though its rating was substantially lower at
the COREPER level. This could be linked to the observation that the level
of national political influence on proposal content and Presidency behaviour
was rather high. In fact, some issues unpopular with national political
elites were not discussed at all, the final compromise formulations could
not contain anything inconvenient to the Czech Government, and in
some cases, the Presidency supported and adopted minority positions if
they were in line with domestic politics. The Presidency’s proposals
were generally seen as good and pertinent. However, according to some,
problems did appear when the Presidency did not consult sufficiently with
the Council Secretariat. 
As stated above, the number of survey respondents was unfortunately too
low to yield representative results. Broader and more in-depth polling,
including personal interviews, would be needed to gather sound data. After
the unflattering depictions of the Czech Presidency in the Brussels press
and elsewhere, the authors were rather surprised by the overall positive
evaluation of its day-to-day performance. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS
Its early start of Presidency preparations, including drafting priorities and
holding discussions with various stakeholders, indicated that the Czech
Republic was taking its first EU Presidency very seriously. The centre–
right government in power viewed the Presidency as an opportunity to
bring fresh ideas and a reform agenda from ‘new Europe’ to what is some-
times viewed as a calcified way of thinking in the EU. This motivation
was also reflected in the Presidency’s overarching motto: ‘Europe without
barriers’. During preparations for the Presidency, the Czech political
representation set itself extremely ambitious goals and arguably too many
priorities for a mid-sized, relatively new EU Member State. The original
list of priorities was gradually pared down as the Presidency approached.
In the face of external developments, the Czech administration was becom-
ing much more realistic as to what was achievable, especially given that
the French Presidency had already concluded some of the dossiers the
Czechs had originally hoped to tackle, such as the energy–climate package
and the CAP Health Check. 
The execution of the Czech Presidency was heavily influenced by two
general factors. The first one was an extremely complicated external
environment. The economic crisis largely shifted the focus of the Presidency
from a pro-liberal, activist economic agenda to defending the basic
economic principles on which the EU is founded and curbing Member
States’ appetite for protectionism. The two initial crises – the outbreak of
violence in Gaza and the gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia –
made the first weeks of the Presidency into mere crisis management. The
Presidency also had to face the substantial scepticism, sometimes border-
ing on hostility, of the West European (particularly French) press and of
the European political leadership, and extremely low expectations connected
with its assumption of office.
The second important variable was the significant internal political
instability of the Czech Government. The Government was unsure of its
support in Parliament, and although there were attempts to conclude an
‘armistice’ with it, the opposition finally initiated the vote of no confidence
that resulted in the Government’s resignation. This effectively deprived the
Presidency of the necessary political capital for the rest of its term.
It turned the big showcases of the Presidency, such as the summit with
President Obama or the Eastern Partnership inauguration summit, into
courtesy meetings rather than high-level summits. In the remaining time,
there is speculation and fear as to the role of President Klaus and whether
he could worsen the already damaged reputation of the Czech Republic. In
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addition, the controversies surrounding the Lisbon Treaty turned out to be
very damaging for the Presidency’s work, as the Government was unable to
promote its ratification robustly enough and defend it, particularly in the
upper chamber. Paradoxically, the fall of the Government might make it
easier to complete the ratification in the Czech Republic during the Czech
term. However, the legal agreements paving the way for the second Irish
referendum will have to be tackled under the Swedish Presidency.
It is difficult to evaluate the Czech Presidency’s midterm performance in
light of the unfavourable external circumstances and the extremely agile
French Presidency that preceded it. The performance that started a bit
hesitantly, with dubious performance during the Gaza crisis, was gradually
winning political points for tackling the gas crisis and the spring economic
summits, and Czech political leadership started to win more confidence
among fellow European leaders. The lethal wound came with the fall of
the Government. To the detriment of the Presidency’s credibility, it was a
move that the country’s political leadership could easily have averted. This
points to a striking lack of statesmanship on the part of the Czech political
representation, to thinking limited to the domestic political playground
rather than the wider European arena, and to an inability to live up to
certain EU expectations. What is potentially even more worrying is the
precedent that the Czech Presidency, with its internal political ructions,
could set for the future: other new Member States holding the Presidency
could well be viewed by other EU Member States with a priori suspicions
similar to those applied to the Czech Republic. It will also definitely (and
this is in fact already happening) strengthen those EU voices calling for a
thorough review of the institution of the Presidency, including the need for
a permanent presidency of the European Council that would give this body
more continuity, stability and credibility. 
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SAMMANFATTNING PÅ SVENSKA
Det tjeckiska ordförandeskapet i EU ägde rum under en svår tid både för
EU och för Tjeckien. Från första stund omgärdades ordförandeskapet
av låga förhoppningar och märkbart tvivel om tjeckernas kompetens att
leda unionen. Tjeckien hade att hantera arvet av ett starkt franskt ord-
förandeskap som agerade beslutsamt i de oväntade kriser som uppstod
under hösten 2008, främst den finansiella krisen och den ryska invasionen i
Georgien. Frankrikes ledarskap med en energisk fransk president i spetsen
blev därmed måttstock trots att detta ordförandeskap var mer undantag än
regel. Därtill försvårades ordförandeskapet av regeringens bekymmer med
att driva igenom ratificeringen av Lissabonfördraget i parlamentet trots att
konstitutionsdomstolens yttrande tillstyrkte fördragets förenlighet med den
tjeckiska grundlagen. Generellt bidrog den inrikespolitiska situationen med
en parlamentariskt utsatt regering samt en uttalat EU-kritisk president till
skepsisen kring Tjeckiens förmåga att visa ledarskap i EU.
Ordförandeskapet sammanföll med en fördjupning av den ekonomiska
krisen som satte in redan under det franska ordförandeskapet. På grund av
sin förhållandevis ringa ekonomi och det faktum att landet står utanför
Euron höjdes kritiska röster mot ordförandeskapets förmåga att förhandla
fram ett effektivt svar på krisen. Trots detta lyckades den tjeckiska rege-
ringen samla EU:s medlemsländer kring ett gemensamt förhandlingsman-
dat inför G20 mötet i London i april 2009, samt ett uttalande om vikten att
förhindra att den pågående ekonomiska krisen används som ursäkt för pro-
tektionistiska åtgärder på nationell nivå som undergräver EU:s inre mark-
nad. Därtill tog ordförandeskapet initiativ till att EU beslutade om ett ytter-
ligare stödpaket om 130 miljarder Euro riktat till hela EU. Detta resultat
fick statsminister Topolanek och kommissionsordförande Barroso att utro-
pa Europeiska rådets möte i mars till ett ”resultatens toppmöte”. Den glo-
bala krisen har tydligt bidragit till att flytta ordförandeskapets fokus till
ekonomiska frågor. Paradoxalt nog såg sig tjeckerna tvungna att försvara
inre marknadens grundläggande principer, trots att de hade flaggat för
ytterligare marknadsliberalisering och regelförenkling som ett av tre priori-
teringsområden under ordförandeskapets upptakt.
Från ordförandeskapets början uppkom ytterligare två utmaningar som
statsministern Topolanek refererar till som 2G: Gaza och gas. Vad gäller
kriget i Gaza var ordförandeskapet mindre lyckosamt men i dispyten mel-
lan Ukraina och Ryssland om leverans av gas lyckades däremot ordföran-
deskapet desto bättre. Med statsminister Topolanek i spetsen, stöttad av
Europeiska kommissionen, löste EU gradvis konflikten. Gasdispyten mel-
lan Ukraina och Ryssland hjälpte också det tjeckiska ordförandeskapet att
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driva en annan central målsättning; att utforma en fullödig extern energi-
säkerhetspolitik för EU. Ett åtagande i denna riktning skrevs in i Europeiska
rådets slutsatser på toppmötet i mars 2009 vilket inbegriper finansiellt stöd
för Nabucco gasledningsprojekt (Euro 200 miljoner) och ambitionen att
förbättra uppkopplingen mellan nationella elnät. Slutligen lyckades ord-
förandeskapet driva på ett antal lagstiftningsärenden i ministerrådet vad
gäller väg- och flygtransport, liberalisering av energisektorn, regler om
banksäkerhet och roamingavgifter.
Den inrikespolitiska situationen i Tjeckien var rakt motsatt den starka upp-
backning som president Sarkozy åtnjöt under det franska ordförandeskapet
både vad gäller borgfred i parlamentet och positiv bevakning i media.
Denna instabilitet kom att förorsaka stora svårigheter för regeringens full-
följande av ordförandeskapet. Det interna grälet mellan parlamentets olika
grupperingar och oppositionens oupphörliga kritik av regeringen resulte-
rade i en misstroendeomröstning i den lägre kammaren den 24 mars 2009
som regeringen förlorade och därmed kastades ordförandeskapet i politiskt
kaos. Det återstår att se hur resten av ordförandeskapsperioden kommer att
fortlöpa, men runt om i Europa finns det en utbredd oro kring det politiska
ledarskapsvakuum som uppstått där president Klaus har fått en allt vikigare
roll. Dessutom kvarstår problematiken kring Lissabonfördragets ratifice-
ring. Risken är uppenbar att ordförandeskapets surt förvärvade framgångar
i början av perioden kommer att glömmas bort och därmed skulle betydel-
sen av ordförandeskapets ambitiösa projekt om det östliga partnerskapet
och den Sydliga energikorridoren också förringas.
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